ARTICLE
National Security Interest Convergence
__________________________
Sudha Setty*
Abstract
Over a decade after the attacks of September 11, 2001, lawmakers, scholars,
activists, and policy makers continue to confront the questions of whether
and to what extent robust counterterrorism laws and policies should be
reined in to protect against the abuse of civil rights and the marginalization
of outsider groups. This Article uses political and critical race theory to
identify areas of national security interest convergence in which political will
can be marshaled to limit some national security policies.
Legislators act in their political self-interest—both in terms of responding to
party forces and constituents—in casting votes that often give primacy to
national security interests at the expense of civil liberties. Actions taken by
legislators which are rights-protective in the national security context are
largely predictable when understood as effects of both political realities and
interest convergence theory. Lawmakers often will not act on the basis of
civil liberties concerns, but will implement rights-protective measures only
because those measures serve another interest more palatable to mainstream
constituencies.
Although unmooring from deontological grounding creates numerous
limitations as to how many rights-protective measures can be implemented
on a long-term basis, interest convergence offers a limited opportunity for
lawmakers and policy experts to leverage self-interest and create single-issue
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coalitions that can protect the rights of outsider groups abused by current
national security policies.
Introduction
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, have transformed the
landscape of national security law and policy in the United States. Nations
have stepped up their counterterrorism laws and policies, making the
consequences of being labeled a terrorist by domestic governments more
severe.1 Over the past decade, lawmakers, scholars, activists and
policymakers have routinely confronted the question of whether and to what
extent robust counterterrorism laws and policies should be curtailed to
protect against the abuse or potential abuse of civil rights and liberties.2
See S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001) (mandating that all UN
member nations take proactive steps to combat terrorism, including increasing
criminalization and implementing harsher sentencing for terrorist acts, freezing funds of
those financing terrorist acts, sharing intelligence information with other member nations,
and tightening border controls to prevent the migration of terrorists). See generally Kim Lane
Scheppele, Other People’s Patriot Acts: Europe’s Response to September 11, 50 LOY. L. REV. 89, 91–
92, 97–98 (2004) (detailing UN Security Council Resolution 1373, which mandated that
countries institute laws combating terrorism, and noting significant shifts in domestic
counterterrorism laws as a result). Additional shifts in the law have been contemplated
under the Obama administration as well. For example, in May 2010, U.S. Attorney
General Eric Holder suggested that Congress consider legislation to expand and define the
public safety exception articulated in New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984) (holding that
the obligation of law enforcement officers to inform arrestees of their right to counsel,
among other rights as articulated in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), was subject to
a public safety exception as the circumstances demanded it). See Charlie Savage, Holder
Backs a Miranda Limit for Terror Suspects, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2010, at A1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/10/us/politics/10holder.html?pagewanted=all.
2 By “rights protection,” I mean those actions taken to protect, improve or expand the civil
and human rights of those most negatively impacted by the U.S. government’s postSeptember 11, 2001, counterterrorism policies. Although judges, scholars and lawyers can
argue as to the efficacy and legality of such measures, within the United States, the
disparate impact of post-September 11 counterterrorism laws and policies has been borne
heavily by Muslims, Arabs, and people hailing from South Asia, the Middle East and North
Africa. See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler et al., Legitimacy and Deterrence Effects in Counter-Terrorism Policing:
A Study of Muslim Americans, 44 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 365 (2010); Girardeau A. Spann, Terror
and Race, 45 WASHBURN L.J. 89, 101–02 (2005) (observing that “the sacrifice of racial
minority interests for majoritarian gain appears to be an intrinsic feature of United States
culture”); Gil Gott, The Devil We Know: Racial Subordination and National Security Law, 50 VILL.
L. REV. 1073, 1073 (2005) (analyzing how “liberal democratic systems might evolve . . . to
counter the socially and politically pernicious effects of . . . religiously-inflected, all ornothing-warfare”); Natsu Taylor Saito, Beyond the Citizen-Alien Dichotomy: Liberty, Security and
1
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Ideological and political differences have obscured the possibility of using
legislative coalitions to enhance protections of civil rights and liberties. This
Article aims to identify potential convergence points for lawmakers seeking
ways to build bipartisan and cross-ideological support for rights-protective
legislation.
This Article draws on Professor Derrick Bell’s theory of “interest
convergence” to identify factors that must exist in terms of political will to
enable Congress and the President to create additional rights-protective
limitations on national security policies.3 Interest convergence is the process
by which the divergent self-interests of different political groups overlap to
the degree necessary to enable the formation of an issue-specific coalition
powerful enough to effect serious policy change. Where Bell used interest
convergence theory to analyze judicial and political decision-making during
the African-American civil rights movements, this Article applies the same
theoretical lens to the post-9/11 security context in which members of
Muslim and Arab communities are often the targeted or disparately
impacted groups.4 It aims to articulate a theory of “national security interest
convergence” that could be used to understand the nature of post-9/11
decision making and identify potential bases on which legislative coalitions
may form.
Part I considers the nature of legislative decision-making as it applies
to questions of national security law-making. Legislative behavior
demonstrates how legislators act in their political self-interest—in terms of
responding to both party forces and constituents—in casting votes that give
the Exercise of Plenary Power, 14 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 389, 391–92 (2005)
(defining otherness as based on race, national origin, ethnicity, and other factors apart from
citizenship); David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN L. REV. 953, 957 (2002) (couching the
disparate treatment of counterterrorism policies as falling on “Arab non-citizens”).
3 The need to create additional limitations on national security policies operates from the
premise that such limitations are necessary. Many thoughtful scholars have argued that the
current structures in place with regard to numerous security policies, such as detention
authority, have achieved a positive, if not ideal, balance of individual rights and security
imperatives. See, e.g., Robert M. Chesney, Who May Be Held? Military Detention Through the
Habeas Lens, 52 B.C. L. REV. 769 (2011); Matthew C. Waxman, Administrative Detention of
Terrorists: Why Detain, and Detain Whom?, 3 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 1, 17–23 (2009).
4 Scholars recognized but did not focus on the potential application of interest convergence
theory soon after September 11. See, e.g., Eric K. Yamamoto et al., American Racial Justice on
Trial—Again: African American Reparations, Human Rights, and the War on Terror, 101 MICH. L.
REV. 1269, 1331–33 (2003).
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primacy to national security interests at the expense of civil liberties, or
arguably vice-versa.
Part II argues that actions taken by legislators that are rightsprotective can be framed in terms of interest convergence theory. Out of
personal conviction and/or the fear of being labeled as “soft on terror” by
political opponents, lawmakers often will not support rights-protective
legislation on the basis of civil liberties concerns alone. However, legislators
may be able to implement such legislation if it is justified in terms that are
more palatable to their constituents, such as curbing government spending
(and thereby curbing intrusive and costly surveillance and monitoring
programs), or protecting the gun ownership privileges of right-wing groups
that may be negatively impacted by antiterrorism legislation. When those
interests are sufficient to generate a political coalition with the requisite
political power to enact rights-protective legislation, national security
interest convergence can occur.
Part III argues that interest convergence offers an opportunity—
albeit limited and highly imperfect—for lawmakers and policy experts
interested in rights protection to leverage the self-interest of other political
groups to create atypical coalitions. While these issue-specific coalitions can
bring political pressure to bear to protect the rights of outsider groups and
those marginalized or abused by national security policies, they require a
rethinking of traditional political platforms and stances.
I. Political Theory and Counterterrorism Legislation
Realist political theory holds that elected politicians, by the very
nature of their position, will generally act in their own political self-interest.5
In order to get re-elected, congressmen and senators must develop and
maintain positions of influence within their party and satisfy influential
constituents and interest groups. These political imperatives then
subsequently compromise their ability to follow their ideological
convictions.6 In the current political environment, in which being labeled as
JUDITH SHKLAR, LEGALISM 111 (1964) (describing politics as “the uncontrolled child of
competing interests and ideologies”).
6 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 244 (Harvard 1991) (“As a
politician/statesman, each representative is interested in getting reelected. Subject to this
constraint, they will try to use their influence on behalf of the ‘public good,’ as they
5
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“soft on terrorism” can cause significant damage, politicians interested in
rights protection must find ways to make such initiatives politically viable.
The manifestation of political self-interest will, naturally, differ from
one politician to the next. To generalize broadly, for liberal politicians from
reliably liberal districts, political self-interest in the post-9/11 context may
have encouraged opposition to indefinite detention of suspected terrorists
and support of greater civil liberties protections for outsider groups.7 For
conservative politicians from reliably conservative districts, political selfinterest may have encouraged the adoption of a more hawkish stance on
national security that involves protections of defense spending, a more
aggressive stance toward the detention and interrogation of detainees, and a
more skeptical view of the legitimacy of the civil rights claims of outsider
groups.8 Thus, in order to legislate greater rights protection, either
conscientiously define it. But they will be reluctant to play the role of politician/statesman
when it seriously endangers their reelection chances.”).
7 See, e.g., Alex Katz, Frank Repeats Call for Defense Spending Cuts, Political Intelligence (Oct. 5,
2011), http://www.bostonglobe.com/2011/10/05/frank-repeats-call-for-defensespending-cuts/64Na8nDSaryDxfXG9e8D9O/story.html (discussing Rep. Barney Frank’s
belief that the military budget should be cut by more than $200 billion per year to decrease
the federal deficit); Press Release, Congressman John Campbell, Bipartisan Group of Reps.
Urges Super Committee to Curb Defense Spending – Project on Government Oversight
(Oct. 3, 2011),
http://campbell.house.gov/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=3081:bipar
tisan-group-of-reps-urges-super-committee-to-curb-defense-spending-project-ongovernment-oversight&catid=16&Itemid=300031 (discussing a bipartisan group of
representatives who support cutting the military defense budget by a significant amount to
reduce the federal deficit over the course of the next decade); Press Release, Congressional
Progressive Caucus, Progressives Vow to Oppose Immunity in FISA Legislation:
Congresswomen Barbara Lee, Lynn Woolsey & Progressives Target Bush Spying Program
with Telecomm (Feb. 8, 2008), http://www.commondreams.org/cgibin/print.cgi?file=/news2008/0208-02.htm. See also Press Release, Congressman J.
Kucinich, Kucinich Asks Tough Questions about FBI Investigation of Anti-War Groups
(July 25, 2011),
http://kucinich.house.gov/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID=253479
(announcing that Rep. Kucinich wrote to Attorney General Holder with concerns
regarding the FBI’s investigation of small pacifist groups).
8 Press Release, Statement by Senators McCain, Lieberman, Graham on Iraq (Sept. 6,
2011),
http://mccain.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=PressOffice.PressReleases&Cont
entRecord_id=40c66dfa-a5a0-fe0a-3ff7-ac3184038d50&Region_id=&Issue_id=1bd7f3a7a52b-4ad0-a338-646c6a780d65 (discussing their disagreement with President Obama’s
decision to decrease the number of U.S. troops in Iraq); Will Inboden, The Bright Side of GOP
Midterm Victories for the Obama Team, Foreign Policy, Sept. 15, 2010,
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lawmakers who believe in such protection and who hail from politically
“safe” districts must constitute a legislative majority, or, more realistically,
coalition building must occur.
Political interest convergence occurs when the divergent self-interests
of different political groups aggregate to form an issue-specific coalition that
is large enough to effect serious policy change.9 The moral imperative to
make a political decision does not generally serve as the primary motivation
for a politician to cast a vote in favor of a rights-protective choice that is
unpopular but protects politically powerless groups. Even if legislators want
to support rights-protective legislation for moral reasons, they cannot simply
follow their own ideological convictions. Casting the vote may require that
the choice be politically advantageous, as well as moral.10 If enough

http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/09/15/the_brightside_of_gop_midterm_vic
tories_for_the_obama_team (noting the benefits of having more Republicans in the
legislature due to their stance on national security and preference for cutting domestic
programs instead of military spending); Brian Montopoli, GOP Candidate Dan Fanelli Backs
Racial Profiling in Ad, CBS News, May 5, 2010, http://www.cbsnews.com/8301503544_162-20004214-503544.html (discussing the references made in Dan Fanelli’s
campaign ad which suggest that he supports the use of racial profiling to fight terrorism).
9 However, some political philosophers have questioned whether the law or the mere
exercise of brute political power is even an appropriate mechanism to achieve the policy
goals of security, democracy, and human rights. See, e.g., Jurgen Habermas, Does the
Constitutionalization of International Law Still Have a Chance?, in THE DIVIDED WEST 115, 116
(2007). Nonetheless, the effect of legal realist thinking among the legislative and executive
branches with regard to national security is that legal comfort and structures serve as the
architecture for any number of rights-denigrating policies, the brunt of which have been
borne by outsider groups. See Sudha Setty, No More Secret Laws: How Disclosure of Executive
Branch Legal Policy Doesn’t Let the Terrorists Win, 57 Kan. L. Rev. 579, 580–81 (2009) (arguing
that Bush administration policies regarding detainee treatment would not exist without
legal comfort offered by Justice Department lawyers). Therefore, considering the nature of
how political power is aggregated becomes an important aspect of determining potential
means to curb overreaching policies.
10 Likewise, commentators have noted that political competition reliably involves
accusations that a political opponent’s claims of acting to further a just cause are, in reality,
simply a political ploy to garner support from certain constituents. See Nancy L.
Rosenblum, ‘Extremism’ and Anti-Extremism in American Party Politics, 12 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
ISSUES, 843, 877 (2002). Cf. REBECCA E. ZIETLOW, ENFORCING EQUALITY: CONGRESS,
THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 9, 58–59, 164 (2006)
(arguing that Congress has acted in rights-protective ways as a matter of principle, such as
the passage of post-Civil War legislation like the Civil Rights Act of 1866).
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politicians are so persuaded, Congress’s potential to flex its power in shaping
rights-protective laws can be fulfilled.11
The pursuit of political self-interest lies at the heart of the realist
theory of legislative action,12 which predicts political behavior based upon
two main factors: the legal and constitutional constraints that apply to
government actors, and the reaction of government actors to the actions of
others such that the self-interest of the government actor prevails.13 The
national security landscape encompasses numerous specific issues that give
rise to different types of political self-interest, not all of which are easily
predictable through political party platforms or traditional left-right political
divides. As such, identifying the specific type of self-interest at play is key to
understanding where potential political interest convergence may lie.
The remainder of this Section examines the nature of legislative
decision-making, party politics, and the political discourse around
counterterrorism legislation. In that context, I consider the limited role of
moral imperatives as a means to identify areas of interest convergence in the
context of national security and rights protection.
A. Legislative Decision-Making
Predicting and managing the dynamic of legislators acting in their
own self-interest is a long-standing issue in American politics.14 James
11 Rebecca Zietlow considers this kind of legislation to protect “rights of belonging,” which
she describes as “those rights that promote an inclusive vision of who belongs to the
national community of the United States and that facilitate equal membership in that
community.” ZIETLOW, supra note 10, at 6.
12 See generally Anthony Downs, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957) (laying out
a framework for public choice theory predicting the actions of legislators). Certainly
contemporary political philosophers have echoed this sentiment. Habermas notes that the
authority of government “consists in the exercise of political power through the
administration of binding law.” Habermas, supra note 9, at 130 (citing Kantian social
contract theory as the undergirding conceptual framework for this view of the relationship
between political power and the law).
13 See Tonja Jacobi, The Impact of Positive Political Theory on Old Questions of Constitutional Law
and the Separation of Powers, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 259, 266 (2006).
14 For a discussion of the theories underpinning legislative decision making, see LIVING
LEGISLATION: DURABILITY, CHANGE & THE POLITICS OF AMERICAN LAWMAKING (Jeffrey
A. Jenkins & Eric M. Patashnik eds., 2012). The framers of the Constitution bore in mind
the lessons of social contract theory and positivist political theory in developing the
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Madison15 opined that while the moral or religious compass of a politician
ought to guide them to make decisions in favor of justice and fairness,16 in
reality such considerations might not be politically beneficial and, therefore,
could not be relied upon.17 In Madison’s view, since political self-interest
would not often serve to protect the rights of the politically powerless,
structural protections such as the separation of powers, the expansiveness
and diversity of the nation, and federalism would protect minorities from
overreaching by majority groups.18
Realist political theory assumes that the political process is governed
by the politician’s pursuit of self-interest in order to ensure his political
survival.19 Under this theory of political behavior, the interests of minority
groups can be furthered only to the extent that those interests are coextensive with the self-interest of the legislator20 or, relatedly, to the extent
separation of powers, even with regard to national security matters. See Aziz Rana, Who
Decides on Security?, 44 CONN. L. REV 1417, at 1426.
15 James Madison, long heralded as the founding generation’s champion of separation of
powers to corral the self-interest of the different branches of the federal government, dwelt
at length on the dangers that self-interest posed. Madison opined that although “justice is
the end of government” and of civil society, and that when majorities of citizens push their
representatives to act without regard for the rights of a minority, societies can be thought to
have entered into a state of anarchy. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51. (James Madison).
16 Madison, on the eve of the 1787 Constitutional Convention, wrote that politicians can be
motivated by political interest, ambition, and public good, but are largely motivated by the
interest and ambition, not by moral imperatives. James Madison, Vices of the Political
System of the United States, ¶ 11 (Apr. 1787), available at http://presspubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch5s16.html. Madison noted that ordinary
citizens were even more prone to act without regard to the greater good. He suggested that
although individuals motivated by the good of the community, character, and religious
conviction would be ideal, in reality none of these factors would likely prevail over acting in
one’s self-interest. Id.
17 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison) (noting that “we well know that neither
moral nor religious motives can be relied on as an adequate control” on political interests).
18 See THE FEDERALIST NOS. 10, 51 (James Madison).
19 Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of the Democratic
Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643, 649–650 (1998).
20 Legal philosopher John Austin observed that “[t]he matter of jurisprudence is positive
law: law strictly and simply so called, or law set by political superiors to political inferiors.”
JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 1 (1832). In the
twentieth century, such thinking gave rise to a “more positive, rational jurisprudence [with]
an emphasis on policy [and] instrumental aims.” See William J. Novak, Making the Modern
American Legislative State, in LIVING LEGISLATION, supra note 14, at 28. Modern examples of
this dynamic abound. See, e.g., Michael T. Heaney, Brokering Health Policy: Coalitions, Parties,
and Interest Group Influence, 31 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 887, 888 (2006) (discussing the
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that the overarching values of a society demand that legislators act to
protect and increase tolerance of minority rights.21 Consequently, if
minority groups are so politically powerless that majority groups can ignore
their interests without suffering a political detriment,22 then the realist vision
predicts a lack of protection for minority groups beyond what is societally
accepted as a bare minimum.23
need for politicians to find “political cover” to support legislation that may be viewed
unfavorably by a majority of voters). Heaney offers supporting examples of how
conservative politicians needed political cover in the form of conservative interest group
support for a health care measure that provided broader coverage to needy individuals in
order to justify their support of the measure. With such cover in place, the potentially
unpopular legislation could be billed as consistent with the interests of skeptical voters. Id.
21 Constitutional values of tolerance constrain decision making at the extreme, even if
legislators do not ideologically embrace them. AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE 352–
54 (2009) (noting that without a strong inculcation of tolerant values in government,
democratic forces in India would lead to extreme marginalization of religious minorities).
Kim Lane Scheppele observes that in many democratic nations, the preservation of these
tolerant values depends on institutions other than the legislature, such as constitutional
courts and central banks. See Kim Lane Scheppele, Parliamentary Supplements (Or Why
Democracies Need More Than Parliaments), 89 B.U. L. REV. 795, 810–812 (2009) (noting that
such institutions are necessary to avoid rash legislative decision-making governed only by
immediate electoral pressure).
22 The structural predicate for assuming that minority interests will be protected is that
powerful political interests rely on the support of the relatively powerless minority groups.
Such a political dynamic is not limited to the United States. Heaney, supra note 20, at 923.
See James Manor, Parties and the Party System, in PARTIES AND PARTY POLITICS IN INDIA 436
(Zoya Hasan, ed. 2011). Manor argues that at least some of the political dominance of the
Congress party in the post-Independence period stemmed from the Congress Party’s
politically popular and pragmatic defense of democratic ideals and the rule of law,
combined with its responsive patronage of influential and outspoken minority groups. Id.
Likewise, extremist minority groups were moderated by the allocation of power and
privilege within the structure of Congress Party dominance. Id. at 439.
23 Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV. 633, 724 (2000) (noting
that “[b]ecause democratic politicians are interested in winning elections, they will be the
first to notice that the victims of ignorance, poverty, and prejudice generally have a hard
time mobilizing themselves for effective political action.”). See also Cameron 'Playing Politics' on
Control Orders - Ed Balls, BBC NEWS (Jan. 6, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics12127325 (showing that only after the Liberal Democrats were able to secure a significant
amount of votes in the 2010 election to form a coalition with the Conservatives, were they
able to influence national security issues); Gurpreet Mahajan, Multiculturalism in the Age of
Terror: Confronting the Challenges, 5 POL. STUD. REV. 317, 325 (2007) (arguing that minorities
must constitute a certain percentage of the population in order for their interests to be
advanced since only then will they be able to “tilt the balance in favour of or against a
political party”). Amartya Sen argues that many lawmakers will disregard the interests of
those who are politically irrelevant, but a society’s “tolerant values” will protect the
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1. Political Parties and Legislative Motives
The Madisonian vision of minority protection is complicated by the
extent to which political parties govern law and policy making.24 To some
degree, the role of political parties in defining political discourse and
priorities was not lost on thinkers of the early republic. Madison
acknowledged that political parties (or “factions”25) made it particularly
difficult for lawmakers to follow their own ideological convictions26 in that
they created another master to whom politicians must answer—not only
must a politician act in his or her own self-interest to ensure re-election, but
he or she must also act in the interest of the faction.27
Of course, in the political climate that developed soon after
ratification,28 and in the ensuing two centuries, political parties have come
to define the behavior of most political actors in most circumstances, even

politically powerless from complete marginalization and abandonment by society.
AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE 352 (2009). Some sense of the tolerant values of a
nation can be found in the constitutional boundaries of what must be provided or what
rights cannot be abrogated. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (striking down a state
statute denying a public education to undocumented immigrant children).
24 Political parties are powerful influences on legislative decision-making, but other forces,
such as outside interest groups, are significant as well. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating
Agencies: Avoiding Capture through Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 19–21 (2010); see
generally Amitai Etzioni, The Capture Theory of Regulations-Revisited, 46 SOC’Y 319 (2009); JeanJacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, The Politics of Government Decision-Making: A Theory of Regulatory
Capture, 1991 106 Q. J. ECON. 1089 (1991).
25 Although Madison did not define a “faction” as a political party, his description of a
faction as “a number of citizens . . . who are united and actuated by some common impulse
of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and
aggregate interests of the community” can be viewed as analogous to parties and their
political platforms. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).
26 In this Article, I sometimes refer to following personal convictions toward a more
inclusive and rights-protective vision of a republic as following one’s “moral compass.”
27 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison) (noting concerns that “the public good is
disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties, and that measures are too often decided, not
according to the rules of justice and the rights of the minor party, but by the superior force
of an interested and overbearing majority.”).
28 Daryl Levinson and Richard Pildes convincingly argue that Madison’s vision was to be
short-lived given the interest of some politicians in developing party alliances in the early
republic. Madison himself was (admittedly unhappily) involved in the rise of the Federalist
and Republican parties. See Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not
Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2320 (2006).
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when a politician’s personal convictions may dictate different legislative
decision-making.29
In terms of rights protection and the broadening national security
state, the interests of the party must be met as a predicate for consideration
of curbing national security measures. If party imperatives counsel toward
maintaining the status quo—not necessarily because of a genuine belief of
the politicians that the status quo is just or fair, but because of a fear of
political repercussions—then rights protection will not be achieved through
adherence to party platforms and pressures as the basis for making voting
decisions.30 Political parties have a profound effect on U.S. policy-making,
but their influence is even more pronounced in parliamentary democracies
such as the United Kingdom and India where party control is more firmly
established.31 Indeed, in the case of India, the ruling Congress Party is
considered to be more influential than the structures of government itself.32
Occasionally, issues split voters (and therefore politicians) in ways
that defy liberal or conservative orthodoxy.33 In such cases, political parties
Id. at 2321–22 (discussing the stabilization of party structure and the party imperative of
winning and keeping political power as the ultimate goal of each party); id. at 2324–25
(discussing the strong correlation between political behavior and party affiliation).
30 Levinson & Pildes, supra note 28, at 2333, 2336 (noting that political parties in the
modern era are ideologically coherent and sharply polarized, leading to a high level of
party discipline in many instances). See also Graham K. Wilson, Congress in Comparative
Perspective, 89 B.U. L. REV. 827, 837–840 (2009) (discussing the shift toward rigid party-line
voting in the House of Representatives since the 1980s); Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 19,
at 652–54 (discussing the important and often undervalued role of the political party in
various court cases, including those dealing with all-white primaries in the Jim Crow South,
such as the line of cases from Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935) (upholding the
constitutionality of all-white party primaries as beyond the purview of the Court’s inquiry
into state action) to Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (holding that the Texas
Democratic Party’s rule barring blacks from participating in the party primary process
violates the Equal Protection Clause)).
31 See Wilson, supra note 30, at 832–835 (discussing the importance of party discipline in the
functioning of government in the United Kingdom).
32 See James Manor, supra note 22, at 434 (arguing that the Congress Party served as the
“central integrating institution” of India’s state and society).
33 See Rosenblum, supra note 10, at 866. Such political behavior in the context of the “war
on terror” has been occurring since soon after the attacks of September 11, 2001. For
example, a cadre of Democrats and Republicans, based in part on opinion polls cataloging
the public’s appetites with regard to national security reform efforts, worked in late 2001
and 2002 to develop a new cabinet agency (what would eventually become the Department
of Homeland Security), despite initial presidential reluctance to support such an idea. See
29
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work to bring politicians into line through intraparty pressure, or to redefine
themselves in ways that appeal to a broader group of constituents.34
However, the inability of political parties to successfully whip the vote,
coupled with a lack of overall consensus among the electorate on a
particular issue, can lead to unusual coalition-building across party lines
based on shared micro-objectives motivated by different concerns.35 Indeed,
coalition building occurs more frequently in parliamentary democracies that
deal with the same tensions in national security and rights protection. As
such, using the United Kingdom and India as exemplars in this analysis is
particularly useful in evaluating some dynamics and latent possibilities of
cross-party U.S. legislative decision-making.
Two examples—that of the short-lived objections to the Patriot Act
amendments and renewals in early 2011,36 and the 2010 U.K.
Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition37 stance toward privacy rights38—

generally Dara Kay Cohen et al., Crisis Bureaucracy: Homeland Security and the Political Design of
Legal Mandates, 59 STAN. L. REV. 673, 689–90 (2006).
34 See Rosenblum, supra note 10, at 862 (noting that parties, in their effort to maintain
loyalty and discipline, are pushed to create broader platforms that encompass a diversity of
viewpoints). See also PEW RESEARCH CTR FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS, BEYOND RED VS.
BLUE: THE POLITICAL TYPOLOGY 1 (May 2011) [hereinafter PEW POLITICAL TYPOLOGY]
(discussing the challenges facing political parties when sub-groups within a party hold views
that diverge from core party principles).
35 Rosenblum argues that politicians are often elected with significant support from singleissue voters who hold their views intensely and expect their politicians to do the same,
regardless of party disciplinary efforts. See Rosenblum, supra note 10, at 865–66. If that is
the case, then politicians have greater incentive to split from their party and form atypical
coalitions in order to further the interests of the single-issue constituents. See also id. at 875
(noting that “Americans have adopted an essentially Machiavellian idea of political virtue:
what matters in a leader is the ability to get results.”) (citation omitted).
36 See Glenn Greenwald, The Patriot Act and Bipartisanship, SALON, May 23, 2011,
http://www.salon.com/2011/05/23/bipartisanship_8/singleton; Charlie Savage, Deal
Reached on Extension of Patriot Act, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2011, at A16, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/20/us/20patriot.html.
37 In some respects, the inability of either major party in the United Kingdom to marshal a
majority in parliament speaks to a lack of party discipline and cohesion that may be part of
a larger trend. See Wilson, supra note 30, at 844–45.
38 See David Cameron & Nick Clegg, The Coalition: Our Programme for Government 11 (May
2010), available at http://www.libdems.org.uk/coalition_agreement.aspx (forming an
agreement between the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats to include greater protections
of civil liberties).
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are discussed in more detail in Part II.39 In those instances, national security
interest convergence occurred through unorthodox coalition building that
rejected straightforward adherence to lawmakers’ respective party
platforms.
Absent the ability to create such a bipartisan or multi-party
coalition, national security policy is held hostage to party imperatives. In the
United States, the major parties have not pushed for significant rights
protection in the last few years and have shifted their political priorities
elsewhere.40

39 Also of note, India’s 2004 parliamentary elections resulted in an uneasy coalition
government that suffered from conflicting political outlooks, but was able to coalesce to
fulfill a campaign promise to repeal the Prevention of Terrorism Act of 2002 (POTA),
considered by members of the 2004 coalition government to have enabled human rights
abuses and fostered corruption. See APURBA KUNDU & EUR. INST. FOR ASIAN STUD.,
WHAT ARE THE FOREIGN AND NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF
CONGRESS’ RETURN TO POWER IN INDIA? 2 (2004) (describing the tensions within the
coalition government led by the Congress Party); UPA committed to repeal POTA: Pranab, The
Times of India, June 6, 2004, available at http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/200406-06/india/27157105_1_repeal-upa-government-prevention-of-terrorism-act (describing
the commitment of the newly elected United Progressive Alliance to the repeal of POTA).
40 See 2012 DEMOCRATIC PARTY PLATFORM, available at
http://www.democrats.org/democratic-national-platform#protecting-rights (addressing
rights protection by noting that “[a]dvancing our interests may involve new actions and
policies to confront threats like terrorism, but the President and the Democratic Party
believe these practices must always be in line with our Constitution, preserve our people's
privacy and civil liberties, and withstand the checks and balances that have served us so
well. That is why the President banned torture without exception in his first week in office.
That is why we are reforming military commissions to bring them in line with the rule of
law. That is why we are substantially reducing the population at Guantánamo Bay without
adding to it. And we remain committed to working with all branches of government to
close the prison altogether because it is inconsistent with our national security interests and
our values”); see also 2012 REPUBLICAN PARTY PLATFORM, available at
http://www.gop.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/2012GOPPlatform.pdf, which
contains two sections that relate to civil liberties. One section argues that “[a]ll security
measures and police actions should be viewed through the lens of the Fourth Amendment;
for if we trade liberty for security, we shall have neither.” Id. at 13. The second relevant
section relates to reform of the Transportation Security Agency, calling for privatization of
the Agency and “look[ing] toward the development of security systems that can replace the
personal violation of frisking.” Id. at 25.
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2. The Political Danger of Being Soft on Terror
In many nations, a politician’s ability to be perceived as “tough on
terrorism” is seen as a predicate of a successful political campaign.41
President George W. Bush governed and ran for re-election in 2004 based
largely on the promise that he would continue to be “tough on terror.” This
strategy was obviously successful, as evidenced by Bush’s re-election and the
maintenance of a Republican majority in the House and Senate that year.42
By 2008, the appeal of this kind of rhetoric had lessened considerably.
Then-Senator Barack Obama’s campaign message of restoring the rule of
law, protecting civil liberties, and curtailing other aspects of the national
security state43 was met with approval by a comfortable majority of the
electorate.44
President Obama, however, sent mixed messages regarding his
national security and civil liberties priorities soon after taking office. Citing
the need to restore the rule of law and protect individual rights, he
immediately signed an executive order to close the prison facility at

41 See, e.g., Christina Pantazis & Simon Pemberton, Reconfiguring Security and Liberty, 52 BRIT.
J. CRIMINOLOGY 651, 652–653 (2012) (noting that the political response in Britain to the
September 11 attacks was driven by populist demands that politicians act tougher than
their opponents with regard to the potential threat of terrorism) [hereinafter Pantazis &
Pemberton].
42 See DAVID COLE & JULES LOBEL, LESS SAFE, LESS FREE 99 (2007) (citing CNN exit polls
from the 2004 presidential election which suggested that voters trusted Republicans in the
area of national security). See also David E. Sanger & Jodi Wilgoren, Bush Adds Teeth to His
Attacks on Kerry, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2004, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/19/politics/campaign/19bush.html (describing Bush’s
presidential campaign tactics during the last 15 days of the campaign, including his
“scathing attack on Mr. Kerry’s national security record” and capitalizing on “the
perception that [President Bush] is strong against terrorism – and . . . continuing doubts
about whether Mr. Kerry is tough enough.”).
43 Adam Cohen, Democratic Pressure on Obama to Restore the Rule of Law, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14,
2008, at A32, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/14/opinion/14fri4.html..?pagewanted=print&_r=0.(n
oting that Democratic legislators were planning to hold then President-Elect Obama to his
campaign promises to restore the rule of law).
44 Id. Critics of the Bush administration’s approach had long suggested that a restoration of
the rule of law would require a backtracking on the Bush administration’s
overmilitarization of security matters that led to significant dimunitions of civil liberties. See,
e.g., Habermas, Fundamentalism and Terror, in THE DIVIDED WEST 8 (2007).
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Guantanamo Bay, Cuba,45 put a temporary stop to the use of military
commissions,46 declared that the United States would abide by its domestic
and international obligations not to torture detainees,47 and ordered the
review of the status of all of the detainees held by the U.S. military.48
Whether out of a genuine change of belief on national security issues or due
to mere political calculation,49 Obama shifted rightward on some issues
shortly after taking office, such as his position on the use of the state secrets
privilege,50 and has stepped back from many rights-protective positions that
he articulated on the campaign trail in 200851 and to some extent in 2009.52
45 See Exec. Order No. 13,492, § 3, 74 Fed. Reg. 4,897 (Jan. 22, 2009) (ordering the closure
of the Guantanamo Bay, Cuba prison facility within a year).
46 Id. § 7 (specifying in the Order that all proceedings before a military commission are to
cease effective immediately).
47 See, e.g., Executive Order 13,491, 74 Fed. Reg. 4893 (Jan. 22, 2009) (ordering that all
interrogations of prisoners comply with the mandates of the Army Field Manual and not
involve coercive techniques).
48 Exec. Order No. 13,492, supra note 45, § 4 (creating a task force and requiring it to
review the status of each detainee). The “Review” was to be comprised of the Attorney
General, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State, Secretary of Homeland Security,
Director of National Intelligence, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and others. Id. §
4(b). The Review had to determine whether each detainee should be “returned to their
home country, released, transferred to a third country, or transferred to another United
States detention facility.” Id. § 3.
49 JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT 25, 41–42 (2012) (observing that both
motivations likely contributed to President Obama’s shift in policy and outlook).
50 See, e.g., Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., where plaintiffs brought suit against a subsidiary
of the Boeing Company alleging that the CIA and other government entities were involved
in an “extraordinary rendition program” as part of the War on Terror, and that they were
severely tortured. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 579 F.3d 943, 949 (9th Cir. 2009)
(reversing the district court’s dismissal of the complaint and remanding the matter). The
government intervened by claiming the state secrets privilege and sought a motion to
dismiss. Id. at 951. General Michael Hayden, who was the director of the CIA, filed a
declaration in support of the motion to dismiss which cited to reasons of national security in
support of the state secrets privilege being upheld. Id.; see also Sudha Setty, Litigating Secrets:
Comparative Perspectives on the State Secrets Privilege, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 201, 259 (2009)
(describing the continuity between the Obama and Bush administrations with regard to
invocations of the state secrets privilege).
51 See Peter Slevin, Obama to Palin: Don’t Mock the Constitution, WASH. POST.COM, (Sept. 8,
2008, 10:09 P.M.), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/44/2008/09/obama-to-palin-dontmock-the-c.html (affirming his belief in access to justice for detainees suspected of
terrorism).
52 Compare President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on National Security (May
21, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-thePresident-On-National-Security-5-21-09) (stating his intentions to close Guantanamo and
decrying prolonged detention), with Scott Shane & Mark Landler, Obama Clears way for
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For example, the administration has fought aggressively to limit the scope
and substance of habeas corpus review for detainees,53 has prosecuted a
Canadian child soldier under the reconstituted military commission
system,54 and has unsuccessfully attempted to curtail attorney access to
detainees at the Guantanamo detention facility.55
Although left-leaning commentators have expressed surprise and
disappointment at Obama’s decision to move to the right on national
security issues,56 when observed through the lens of political self-interest and

Guantanamo Trials, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2011, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/08/world/americas/08guantanamo.html (reporting
Obama’s decision to resume military trials and the President’s inability to close
Guantanamo as promised in 2009). Congress shares responsibility for the continued
operation of the Guantanamo detention facility. See Charlie Savage, Vote Hurts Obama’s Push
to Empty Cuba Prison, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2010, at A24, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/23/us/politics/23gitmo.html?_r=0. The decisions to
forbid the use of torture and to disallow the use of evidence gleaned through coercion in
military commissions are notable examples of the Obama administration following through
with campaign promises regarding restoration of the rule of law. See Exec. Order No.
13,491, supra note 47. Pub. L. 111-84, 123 Stat. 2190.
53 See Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F. 3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (dismissing habeas claims of
detainees held at the Bagram Air Force Base in Afghanistan); Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.
3d 866, 877–8 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding that preponderance of the evidence standard and
use of hearsay in habeas corpus hearings was constitutionally permissible).
54 See DEP’T OF DEFENSE, KHADR CONVENING AUTHORITY DIPLOMATIC PAPERS (2010),
available at
http://www.defense.gov/news/Khadr%20Convening%20Authority%20Diplomatic%20P
apers%20AE%20342%2013%20Oct%202010%20%28redacted%29.pdf (including
diplomatic correspondence between the Canadian and U.S. government with regard to the
military commission trial of Omar Khadr, his sentencing, and the possibility of repatriating
him to Canada); see also Military Commission Trial of Ex-Child Soldier, HUM. RTS WATCH (Oct.
15, 2010) http://www.hrw.org/news/2010/10/15/qa-omar-khadr-trial (describing the
international legal issues arising from the detention and trial of a child soldier).
55 See In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Continued Access to Counsel, Misc. No. 12-398
(RCL) (D.D.C. 2012) (rejecting the government’s plan to significantly curtail attorney
access for Guantanamo detainees as contrary to constitutionally afforded habeas
protections), available at http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/423448-lamberthruling.html.
56 See, e.g., Peter Finn & Anne E. Korblut, Guantanamo Bay: Why Obama hasn’t Fulfilled His
Promise to Close the Facility, WASH POST.COM, Apr. 23, 2011,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/guantanamo-bay-how-the-white-house-lost-thefight-to-close-it/2011/04/14/AFtxR5XE_story.html (noting that the lack of closure of the
Guantanamo facility is viewed by Obama’s “liberal base” as a failure).

200

201

Harvard National Security Journal / Vol. 4

party imperatives,57 Obama’s actions make sense. He largely neutralized
Republican efforts to label him as “soft on terror.”58 The vast majority of
congressional Democrats have followed suit,59 leading to a tremendous
amount of bipartisanship in Congress to support more robust national
security measures that do little to address civil liberties and privacy
concerns.60
For the Obama administration and the Democratic Party, the
political cost of tacking right on national security issues has been minimal.
Candidates in the 2012 Republican Party primaries offered a national
security vision that is less pluralistic and more hawkish than what President
Of course, it is possible to view President Obama’s shift on national security policy not as
a matter of political expediency, but as the necessary toughening of U.S. stances on
national security issues in the post-September 11 context. See generally Bruce Ackerman, The
Emergency Constitution, 113 Yale L.J. 1029 (2004) (discussing the need for constitutional
emergency measures that may compromise civil liberties but are limited by some
parameters and are necessary to deal with emergency situations like large-scale terrorist
attacks). Under that premise, the failure to jettison civil rights and liberties in favor of
robust national security measures would be morally and politically unforgivable. Others
have disagreed with Ackerman’s premise and argued that constitutional protections for
individual rights must hold firm even in (and perhaps especially in) times of danger. See, e.g.,
David Cole, Judging the Next Emergency: Judicial Review and Individual Rights in Times of Crisis,
101 MICH. L. REV. 2565 (2004).
58 Scott Wilson & Jon Cohen, Poll Finds Broad Support for Obama’s Counterterrorism Policies,
WASH. POST, Feb. 8, 2012, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/pollfinds-broad-support-for-obamas-counterterrorismpolicies/2012/02/07/gIQAFrSEyQ_story.html.
59 Legislation to curtail the President’s ability to close the Guantanamo facility was passed
by a Democratic House and Senate in 2010. Charlie Savage, Vote Hurts Obama’s Push to
Empty Cuba Prison, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2010, at A24, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/23/us/politics/23gitmo.html.
60 This dynamic is abundantly clear in recent congressional sessions, exemplified in a
number of bills supported by Democrats and Republicans. See, e.g., Military Tribunals for
Terrorists Acts of 2011, H.R. 478, 112th Cong. (2011) (bipartisan bill requiring all foreign
suspects of terrorism to be tried before military tribunals instead of in civilian court); Keep
our Communities Safe Act of 2011, H.R. 1932, 112th Cong. (2011) (bipartisan bill
amending the Immigration and Nationality Act to extend the detention of aliens who had
been ordered removed); S. Res. 174, 112th Cong. (2011) (a bipartisan proposal for a Senate
Resolution regarding the importance of sharing information on passenger flight manifests).
In this vein, Democrats have positioned themselves to fend off Bush-era conservative
critiques that liberals were “carping” about national security policies that were merely
matters of “inconvenience and annoyance,” not taking seriously the gravity of the national
security threats at issue. Philip Bobbitt, TERROR AND CONSENT: THE WARS FOR THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 246 (2008).
57
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Obama sought.61 Such a dynamic has made it politically difficult for leftleaning Democratic politicians or liberties-oriented Republican politicians
to curtail national security overreaching for fear of being labeled as “soft on
terror” themselves.62
Politicians attempting to avoid the label of “soft on terror” has
effectively disallowed straightforward discourse on rights protection in the
United States since President Obama took office.63 When rights-protective
proposals are brought forward, various interest groups frame those
initiatives as a weakness that generates political vulnerability.64 This makes
it difficult, if not impossible, for politicians to promulgate rights-protective
proposals.65
61 Ben Smith & Maggie Haberman, GOP Takes Harsher Stance Toward Islam, POLITICO.COM
(Aug. 15, 2010, 7:09 A.M.), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0810/41076.html
(noting the GOP shift toward harsher and less pluralistic stances on issues ranging from the
creation of an Islamic cultural center in lower Manhattan to the convening of hearings on
the radicalization of Muslims in the United States as a potential national security threat).
62 Recent polling suggests that while issues related to national security were deeply
politically divisive in 2005, that divide shrunk considerably by 2011. See PEW POLITICAL
TYPOLOGY, supra note 34, at 89.
63 For example, the 2008 Democratic Party platform contained strong and specific
language on the need to protect civil rights and civil liberties while maintaining a strong
counterterrorism program. See supra note 40, for discussion of the specific language used in
the platform. Further, structural protections in some parliamentary models allow for
political parties interested in greater rights protection to be represented in the cabinet or
other positions of power even if they are not successful in an election. Such an
arrangement, although not a feature of the United States governmental structure, has been
recommended as a potential avenue for improving the functioning and fairness of
representative government. See David Fontana, Government in Opposition, 119 YALE L.J. 548,
584–85 (2009) (noting that such an arrangement protects vulnerable minority groups and
“prevents unconstrained winners from overreaching”).; see also Bruce Ackerman, supra note
23, at 712–13 (noting that structural arrangements in parliamentary systems can
simultaneously facilitate greater rights protections and efficiency).
64 The 2009 debates over the closure of the prison facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba,
illustrate this dynamic. See David M. Herszenhorn, Senate Leaders Balk at Closing Guantanamo
Prison, N.Y. TIMES.COM (May 19, 2009, 11:48 A.M.)
http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/05/19/senate-leaders-balk-at-closingguantanamo-prison/ (visited July 27, 2011) (noting that although Democratic leaders had
initially supported closure of the Guantanamo facility due to concerns over detainee
treatment there, they retreated from that position after partisan rhetoric that emphasized
the danger of coddling “terrorists”).
65 See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Obama Would Move Some Detainees to U.S., N.Y. TIMES, May 22,
2009, at A1, available at
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Although certain politicians continued to discuss the need for rights
protection as a policy-making imperative,66 such discourse gained little
traction, even when Democrats controlled both chambers of Congress and
the White House.67 When Democrats saw rights protection as a political
liability, they rapidly distanced themselves from unpopular stances that
protected outsider groups,68 thus fulfilling Madisonian predictions that a

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/22/us/politics/22obama.html?pagewanted=all
(discussing the Obama administration’s defense of its antiterrorism policies based on
Republican efforts to label him as “weak on terror”). See S. Amdt. 1113, 111th Cong.
(2009), available at http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.uscongress/legislation.111samdt1133 (showing a
large supporting vote, 90-6, in the Senate to prohibit funding to transfer, release, or
incarcerate Guantanamo Bay detainees to or within the United States).
66 See The Legal Rights of Guantanamo Detainees: What Are They, Should They Be Changed, and is an
End in Sight? Before the Subcomm. on Terrorism, Tech. and Homeland Sec., S. Committee on the
Judiciary, 110th Cong. 231–32, (2007) (statement of Sen. Russ Feingold, Subcomm. on
Terrorism, Tech. and Homeland Sec., S. Judiciary Comm.) (arguing that our freedom and
due process rights have been compromised); Amanda Terkel, Russ Feingold: 'It's A Threat To
Our Country' To Elect One Of The GOP Presidential Candidates, HUFFINGTON POST, Feb. 21,
2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/21/russ-feingold-book-gop2012_n_1289428.html (quoting former Senator Feingold, “[i]t's one thing if the Bush
actions with regard to civil liberties are sort of an outlier. It's far more dangerous if it
becomes reaffirmed under a progressive president like President Obama. . . . [P]rogressives
need to urge the president to pick up his game on civil liberties both now and in his second
term . . . .”).
67 See, e.g., Eric Lichtblau & Carl Hulse, Democrats Seem Ready to Extend Wiretap Powers, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 7, 2007) (showing how Democrats chose to use their majority power in both
chambers of Congress).
68 See John J. Farmer, Jr., Introduction: Awaiting “the Authorities”: 9/11 and National Security
Doctrine After Ten Years, 63 RUTGERS L. REV. 1085, 1092 (2010) (stating that although
Democrats initially supported rights-protective measures, they began in 2009 to reverse and
decided to keep Guantanamo Bay open indefinitely, with detainees being held
preventatively without charges or a trial, and to reauthorize the Patriot Act’s surveillance
provisions); Max Fisher, Why Democrats Should Run on National Security, THE ATLANTIC, Feb.
22, 2010, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2010/02/whydemocrats-should-run-on-national-security/36367/ (arguing that Democrats should frame
the issue of national security on their own terms even though “specific policies—civilian
trials for terrorists, banning torture—poll poorly,” but recognizing the administration’s
reluctance because “[t]he White House likely fears that tying Obama too publicly to his
unpopular policies will tarnish his generalized popularity on national security.”).
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politician’s moral compass69 may not guide his or her decision-making if a
political cost would be incurred.70
I am not arguing that morality is entirely absent in the political
discourse around rights protection. In the last decade, the moral imperatives
of politicians71 to demand greater protections for civil rights and liberties
have made their mark in curbing excessive or overreaching
counterterrorism legislation in the United States and other nations,72 or at

69 However, there are instances in which a politician’s moral compass may also guide
him/her to create draconian policies that he/she may perceive to serve the greater good of
national security. See Peter Margulies, True Believers at Law: Legal Ethics, National Security
Agendas, and the Separation of Powers, 68 MD. L. REV. 1, 1 (2008) (arguing that John Yoo and
other architects of the Bush administration interrogation policy acted in accordance with
their good faith belief that achieving security was the ultimate and morally correct priority
and that torture may have been necessary to achieve security).
70 James Madison, supra note 16, ¶ 11 (arguing that “representative appointments” or
politicians are predominately motivated by ambition and self interest over the public good).
Of course, such political maneuvering is simply the natural effect of a republican
government that is accountable to popular will. See ADAM TOMKINS, OUR REPUBLICAN
CONSTITUTION 51 (2005) (describing the responsiveness of republican government to the
electorate as a positive aspect of British constitutionalism). Legislators are further limited by
their own collective sense of deference to the President with regard to national security
matters, based in large part on the current popular belief that they are less qualified to
opine on security matters than the executive branch. See Aziz Rana, Who Decides on Security?
44 CONN. L. REV. 1417, 1460–-63 (2012) (arguing that Congress has ceded its authority to
make national security decisions since at least World War II); Josh Chafetz, Congress’s
Constitution, at *6 (forthcoming, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 715, 721 (2012) (noting that Congress’s
sense of insecurity about its role in national security matters, combined with a lack of
consensus in Congress about how to act, has led to Congress not exercising its hard or soft
power in determining the parameters of the security state).
71 Some argue that Congress is the best branch of government to provide for the protection
of vulnerable groups. See, e.g., LOUIS FISHER, DEFENDING CONGRESS AND THE
CONSTITUTION 103 (2011) (arguing that throughout the Reconstruction era and in the
early twentieth century, Congress showed the most promise at protecting the rights of racial
minorities and women).
72 See The Prevention of Terrorism (Repeal) Act, No. 26 of 2004, INDIA CODE (2004),
available at http://indiacode.nic.in (repealing the Act which led to many human rights
abuses in India and gained great opposition from the public); Home Secretary Theresa May
Wants Human Rights Act Axed, BBC NEWS, Oct. 2, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/ukpolitics-15140742 (citing the conservatives desire to get rid of the Human Rights Act since
it provides greater human rights protections to, what they believe is, a fault, but suggesting
that the coalition with the Liberal Democrats prevented them from doing so). But see The
Unlawful Activities (prevention) Amendment Ordinance, No. 29 of 2004, INDIA CODE
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least in highlighting the costs of such excesses.73 Indeed, President Obama’s
2008 presidential campaign gained support based, in part, on the need to
maintain the rule of law, preserve civil liberties, and rein in the use of
executive power,74 and prior to that, lawmakers interested in investigating
potential civil rights abuses in counterterrorism efforts were able to make
some headway.75
However, given the current tenor and substance of political
discourse in the United States, it seems unlikely that rights protection of
outsider groups will surface as a political priority.76 Such consolidated and
(2010), available at http://indiacode.nic.in (incorporating many of the provisions that were
in The Prevention of Terrorism Act).
73 See Senator Russell Feingold, On Opposing the U.S.A. PATRIOT Act, Address at the
Associated Press Managing Editors Conference at the Milwaukee Art Museum, Milwaukee,
Wisconsin (Oct. 12, 2001), available at http://www.archipelago.org/vol6-2/feingold.htm
(cautioning that “we must continue to respect our Constitution and protect our civil
liberties in the wake of the attacks,” and that Congress is “press[ing] for the enactment of
sweeping new powers for law enforcement that directly affect the civil liberties of the
American people without due deliberation by the peoples’ elected representatives.”).
74 For a discussion of how the Obama administration’s invocation of the state secrets
privilege is consistent with—and sometimes more aggressive than—the George W. Bush
administration’s use of the privilege, despite Obama’s campaign pledges to the contrary, see
generally Sudha Setty, Litigating Secrets: Comparative Perspectives on the State Secrets Privilege, 75
BROOK. L. REV. 201 (2009).
75 In 2006, after Democrats took control of Congress, numerous investigations were
launched into the Bush administration’s national security apparatus. See, e.g., Balancing
Privacy and Security: The Privacy Implications of Government Data Mining Programs:
Hearing before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007); Combating War
Profiteering: Are we going enough to investigate and prosecute contracting fraud and abuse
in Iraq?: Hearing before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007); Misuse of
Patriot Act Powers: The Inspector General’s Findings of Improper Use of the National
Security Letters by the FBI: Hearing before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong.
(2007); Will REAL ID Actually Make Us Safer? An Examination of Privacy and Civil
Liberties Concerns: Hearing before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007).
Scholars have noted that motivation for such investigations may not have been
deontological, but may have simply served the purpose of political gain. See Fontana, supra
note 63, at 606–07 (noting that the 2007 investigations in torture practices at Abu Ghraib
and other detention facilities may have been motivated by genuine moral outrage, the
desire for political gain, or both).
76 See 2012 DEMOCRATIC PARTY PLATFORM and 2012 REPUBLICAN PARTY PLATFORM,
supra note 40 (with little language indicating rights protection as a legislative priority). See
also PEW POLITICAL TYPOLOGY, supra note 34, at 95 (finding that 40% of the U.S. public
believes that Islam, as a religion, encourages violence more than other religions, whereas
only 42% of the public think that it does not). Such a finding may suggest that the
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widespread government support for any measure advertised as being “tough
on terrorism” is not a new phenomenon in U.S. history.77
II. Interest Convergence Theory and National Security Lawmaking
To understand the political dynamic underpinning the debate over
increasing security measures and protecting civil liberties, realist theories
about legislative decision-making provide a useful starting point. Interest
convergence theory and its relationship to the current political debates over
national security can further frame the political dynamic and identify
potential areas for rights-protective change in the national security context.
A. Interest Convergence Theory
Professor Derrick Bell developed interest convergence theory in the
1980s in order to understand key Supreme Court decisions and legislative
actions in the African-American civil rights movement of the mid-twentieth
century. Bell’s interest convergence theory in this context holds that
politically powerful groups in the United States (namely elite white people)
would only support racial justice initiatives at the point where a selfinterested cost-benefit analysis suggested such support to be worthwhile.
Bell posits that a decision such as Brown v. Board of Education,78 often
hailed as a seminal case demonstrating the judicial commitment to equal

protection of Muslims against overreaching counterterrorism measures is not a high
priority for the majority of Americans.
77 The internment of Japanese residents and Japanese Americans during World War II,
facilitated and enabled by Congress, is perhaps one of the most egregious examples in U.S.
history of overreaching in the name of national security. See Pub. L. No. 77-503 56 Stat.
173 (1942) (authorizing the exclusion of those of Japanese descent from the West Coast of
the United States). The Supreme Court affirmed the exclusion orders that followed, though
with some vigorous dissenting opinions. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 233
(1944) (Murphy, J., dissenting) (noting that exclusions of Japanese Americans under
Executive Order 9066, upheld by the majority, amounted to the “ugly abyss of racism”); id.
at 226 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (arguing that the conviction of Fred Korematsu for defying
the exclusion order was tantamount to convicting him for “not submitting to imprisonment
in a concentration camp, based on his ancestry”); id. at 246 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the majority had “validated the principle of racial discrimination in criminal
procedure.”).
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protection in the United States, is rather a reflection of a need to fulfill
interests of the white majority population, which incidentally benefit
blacks.79 In particular, Bell views Brown as part of the U.S. government’s
effort to improve its human rights record during the Cold War, an era in
which the United States was battling the Soviet Union for influence in
postcolonial emerging democracies.80 Bell concludes that without such
motivations that appealed to government and elite white interests, decisions
like Brown likely would never have been made.
Bell’s Cold War interest convergence hypothesis relied upon some of
the same foreign policy dynamics that raised concerns about U.S.
counterterrorism programs in the post-9/11 context. First, the racist policies
of the World War II and early Cold War eras were widely publicized in
anti-American messaging to emerging, post-colonial democracies that had
yet to form their geopolitical allegiances.81 Second, the Truman
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that the racial
segregation of public schoolchildren was in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
14th Amendment).
79 Derrick Bell, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L.
REV. 518 (1980) [hereinafter Bell, Interest Convergence]. Bell queries why, in 1954, the
principle of “separate but equal” became constitutionally untenable, when segregation laws
similar to those challenged in Brown had been upheld consistently for the prior 100 years.
Id. at 523–24. He concludes that:
78

[T]he availability of Fourteenth Amendment protection in racial cases may not
actually be determined by the character of harm suffered. . . . Racial remedies
may instead be the outward manifestations of unspoken and perhaps subconscious
judicial conclusions that the remedies, if granted, will secure, advance, or at least
not harm societal interests deemed important by middle and upper class whites.
Racial justice—or its appearance—may, from time to time, be counted among the
interests deemed important by the courts and by society’s policymakers.
Id. at 523. For powerful analyses supporting the applicability of interest convergence theory
to Brown v. Board of Education, see generally Richard Delgado, Explaining the Rise and Fall of
African-American Fortunes: Interest Convergence and Civil Rights Gains, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev.
369 (2002); MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2000).
80 See Bell, Interest Convergence, supra note 79, at 524; see also Dudziak, supra note 79.
81 DUDZIAK, supra note 79, at 12 (describing extensive international attention given to racial
discrimination sanctioned by the U.S. Government, and the use of U.S. racial problems by
the Soviet Union in the late 1940s to stoke foreign relations problems for the United States
in Asia, Africa, and Latin America). Dudziak asserts that “[c]oncern about the effect of
U.S. race discrimination on Cold War foreign relations led the Truman administration to
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administration argued that the improvement of the U.S. civil rights record
was essential as part of the overall Cold War strategy.82 The Truman
administration simultaneously argued that the judiciary should play an
active role in improving and enforcing racial equality.83 It is, therefore,
unsurprising that President Truman’s Justice Department filed an amicus
brief in Brown v. Board of Education that contextualized the desegregation case
in the Cold War imperative to spread democracy throughout the world.84
adopt a pro-civil rights posture as part of its international agenda to promote democracy
and contain communism.” Id. at 27. This thinking was reflected in contemporaneous media
accounts, such as a New York Times Magazine article published in 1948 in which the
author laments that although “the nation finds itself the most powerful spokesman for the
democratic way of life . . . [i]t is unpleasant to have the Russians publicize our continuing
lynchings, our Jim Crow statutes and customs, our anti-Semitic discriminations and our
witch-hunts; but is it undeserved?” Id. at 29 (internal citations omitted). Dudziak offers
further evidence in the reports of diplomats and State Department officials expressing
concern as to the extent to which U.S. racial discrimination undermined U.S. foreign
policy efforts. Id. at 29–39.
82 See PRESIDENT’S COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RIGHTS, TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS 100-101
(1947) (noting that “our civil rights record has growing international implications. These
cannot safely be disregarded by the government at the national level which is responsible
for our relations with the world” and arguing that powers usually left to the states such as
law enforcement, voting, and education, may need to be shifted to the federal level to deal
with the international implications of U.S. racial discrimination). The Committee report
bluntly stated the need for improving race relations in the United States as a foreign policy
and security matter:
Our position in the postwar world is so vital to the future that our smallest actions
have far-reaching effects. We have come to know that our own security in a highly
interdependent world is inextricably tied to the security and well-being of all
people and all countries. Our foreign policy is designed to make the United States
an enormous, positive influence for peace and progress throughout the world. We
have tried to let nothing, not even extreme political differences between ourselves
and foreign nations, stand in the way of this goal. But our domestic civil rights
shortcomings are a serious obstacle.
Id. at 146. See also HARRY S TRUMAN, SPECIAL MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS, ON CIVIL
RIGHTS (1948) (emphasizing the need to improve race relations in the United States as part
of a national security imperative). The Truman administration also offered moral and
economic justifications for improving the U.S. civil rights record. See Dudziak, supra note
79, at 79–80.
83 See TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS, supra note 82, at 105–110 (citing the constitutional
responsibilities of the judiciary to improve and enforce racial justice).
84 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954), at 6, 1952 WL 82045 at *6. The Truman Administration describes the
government’s interest in the case in blunt foreign policy terms:
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Bell’s interest convergence theory is not limited to judicial decisionmaking. He argued that executive action can also be understood through
interest convergence theory, citing President Abraham Lincoln’s use of the
Emancipation Proclamation.85 Here, Bell asserted that the Emancipation
Proclamation was rights-protective in that it freed enslaved African
Americans, but that Lincoln’s primary purpose in issuing the proclamation
at the time and in the manner that he did was to undermine Confederate
troop strength by empowering Southern blacks to stop fighting and working
for the Confederacy.86 In terms of legislative action at the time, Bell
contends that the post-Civil War amendments not only protected the
interests of the newly emancipated slaves, but also helped solidify the
political prospects of the Republican Party.87
Scholars have applied Bell’s interest convergence theory to legislative
actions as well, arguing that recent efforts to cut back the prison population
through reformation of state laws will undoubtedly benefit the poor people
of color who make up a disproportionately large sector of the prison
population;88 this aspect of the legislation led to the NAACP lending its
support to reform efforts by fiscal conservatives who focused almost

It is in the context of the present world struggle between freedom and tyranny that
the problem of racial discrimination must be viewed. The United States is trying
to prove to the people of the world, of every nationality, race, and color, that a
free democracy is the most civilized and secure form of government yet devised by
man. We must set an example for others by showing firm determination to remove
existing flaws in our democracy.
The existence of discrimination against minority groups in the United States has
an adverse effect upon our relations with other countries. Racial discrimination
furnishes grist for the Communist propaganda mills, and it raises doubts even
among friendly nations as to the intensity of our devotion to the democratic faith.
Id.
85 Bell, Interest Convergence, supra note 79, at 524.
86 Derrick A. Bell, Brown v. Board of Education: Reliving and Learning from Our Racial History, 66
U. PITT. L. REV. 21, 24 (2004).
87 Id. at 23.
88 Michelle Alexander, In Prison Reform, Money Trumps Civil Rights, N.Y. TIMES, May 15,
2011, at WK9, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/15/opinion/15alexander.html.
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exclusively on the need to cut costs and reduce state budget deficits.89 The
combined efforts of fiscal conservatives and civil rights groups may be
sufficient to move the legislative process.90 Although Bell’s interest
convergence work focused largely on African-American civil rights, his
framework for evaluating judicial and political decision-making lends itself
to the post-9/11 security context in which Muslims and Arabs are the
targeted or disparately impacted groups.91
B. Framing Efforts to Curtail National Security Programs in the Post- 9/11
Context
Bell recognized that some whites who worked toward racial justice in
the 1950s and 1960s were motivated by a moral imperative—the
recognition that racial equality was worth fighting for, and that it ought to
be the primary motivation of legislators. However, Bell also recognized that
the number of whites motivated by racial justice was simply insufficient to
effect reform.92
The same may be said for politicians in the post-9/11 context.
Rights-protective arguments that were once championed by Democrats in
Congress—for example, curtailing warrantless surveillance by the
government, complying with international law obligations regarding the
detention and trial of terrorism suspects, and reforming the laws governing
removal of immigrants—have fallen prey to the phenomenon that Bell
observed: There is simply not enough political will to support these
objectives to meaningfully alter national security laws or policies. However,

89 See Jesse Washington, NAACP Joins With Gingrich in Urging Prison Reform, ASSOCIATED
PRESS (April 7, 2011), available at http://cnsnews.com/news/article/naacp-joins-gingrichurging-prison-reform. The article described the interest of fiscal conservative Grover
Norquist as follows: “Norquist said his group got involved because when it comes to making
the argument for reducing the number of prisoners, “liberals can’t do it. People say, ‘You
just want to let all the murderers out.’ But we are spending a great deal of money keeping
people in prison, and for many of them it doesn’t make sense to keep them there year after
year.” Id.
90 Id.
91 Scholars recognized but did not focus on the potential application of interest convergence
theory soon after September 11. See, e.g., Eric K. Yamamoto supra note 4, at 1331–33.
92 See Bell, Interest Convergence, supra note 79, at 525 (asserting that “the number [of whites]
who would act on morality alone was insufficient to bring about the desired racial
reform.”).
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framing those initiatives in a way that speaks to mainstream constituencies is
the next-best option.
The following Subsections lay out areas in which rights-protective
legislation can gain political traction by reframing initiatives in terms that
will appeal to more legislators and their major constituencies.

1. Foreign policy
Effective foreign policy depends on the ability of the United States to
maintain its soft power, which in turn depends on maintaining the respect of
other nations and preserving the willingness of our allies to cooperate with
us on policy and security matters. That respect and willingness is most
forthcoming when the United States acts as a vanguard in protecting the
rights of the politically powerless. The perception that U.S. soft power in
foreign relations or U.S. counterterrorism and intelligence efforts might be
jeopardized could—as it did in Bell’s original thesis—serve as a persuasive
means of garnering support for rights protective measures.
Thus, there are two important facets to the relationship between
foreign policy and rights-protective interest convergence. First, the U.S.
government has made it an imperative to win over the support and loyalty
of allied nations who are skeptical of U.S. antiterrorism efforts that
previously have been dismissive of the countries’ own priorities and cultural
norms.93 This, in many respects, reflects the most natural application of
93 See Remarks of John O. Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and
Counterterrorism Affairs, Remarks at Harvard Law School: Strengthening Our Security
By Adhering to Our Values and Laws (Sept. 16, 2011), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/16/remarks-john-o-brennanstrengthening-our-security-adhering-our-values-an. Additionally, the U.S. military has
made clear that part of the effort to build and maintain transnational allegiances must
involve remaining sensitive to the cultural viewpoints of other nations, and maintaining a
respect for the views of allied nations. See ADMIRAL MICHAEL G. MULLEN, CHAIRMAN OF
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, THE NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 2011: REDEFINING AMERICA’S MILITARY LEADERSHIP, 10 (Feb.
2011) (hereinafter “2011 NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY”) (noting that “[w]ith partner
nation support, we will preserve forward presence and access to the commons, bases, ports,
and airfields commensurate with safeguarding our economic and security interests
worldwide. We must thoughtfully address cultural and sovereignty concerns in host
countries. Global posture remains our most powerful form of commitment and provides us
strategic depth across domains and regions.”).

2012 / National Security Interest Convergence

Bell’s interest convergence theory, which addressed the interests of the U.S.
political elites in the context of the Cold War. The Brown v. Board of Education
decision helped market the United States as a post-World War II moral
authority, responsive to the concerns of emerging democracies and to the
growing international focus on human rights treaties and protocols.94 In the
post-September 11 context, government responses to concerns that the
United States has flouted its own human rights standards,95 disregarded the
rule of law,96 and lacked sensitivity to Muslims around the world,97 have
served not only moral interests, but realpolitik interests as well. In this
respect, the framing of rights protection as a foreign policy matter has
occurred on occasion, but has not been consistent.
Second, the United States government has made clear that military
and homeland security readiness depends heavily on the intelligence and
cooperative security efforts of allied nations.98 Although the U.S. military
94 Bell argues that powerful whites, in government and in the powerful strata of U.S.
society, benefited immediately from the Brown decision by providing immediate credibility
to U.S. efforts to counter Communist threats and increase its sphere of influence in
developing nations. Bell, Interest Convergence, supra note 79, at 524 (citing a Time
magazine article in which the Brown decision is described as having a profound
international impact in terms of improving the perception of U.S. leadership and moral
standing).
95 Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Economic Consequences of Mr. Bush, VANITY FAIR (Feb. 2007), available
at http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2007/12/bush200712 (describing the
difficulties America faces from Bush’s term in office, including being the “most disliked
country in the world” for reasons such as Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib).
96 See, e.g., Mohamed v. Sec'y of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, [2009]
EWHC 2549, [7] (Admin) (Eng.), Case No. CQ/4241/2008, Oct. 16, 2009 (discussing the
rule of law problems involving the U.S. extraordinary rendition of U.K. citizen Binyam
Mohamed, and the subsequent pressure exerted by the U.S. government on the U.K.
Foreign Office to forestall litigation by Mohamed); see also Sudha Setty, Litigating Secrets:
Comparative Perspectives on the State Secrets Privilege, 75 Brook. L.R. 201, 240-44 (2009) (for a
fuller discussion of the rule of law issues surrounding Binyam Mohamed’s case..)..
97 See THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, 3, 19, 22 (2010) (highlighting
the importance of improving outreach to Muslim communities around the world as one
means to strengthen U.S. national security interests).
98 See 2010 NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 97, at 112 (highlighting the
importance of preserving alliances and developing transnational counterterrorism
strategies). The United States government has leveraged the near-universal understanding
that countries must rely on each other for valuable counterterrorism intelligence to pressure
other governments to comply with its preferred course of action, under threat of
withholding counterterrorism intelligence garnered by the United States. See, e.g.,
Mohamed v. Sec'y of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, [2008] EWHC
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does not suggest that unilateral security operations are untenable, military
leaders have made clear that unilateral action is less desirable and often less
successful.99 Further, a majority of the American public desires that the
government continue seeking multilateral solutions to transnational
issues,100 which provides popular support for working with allied nations on
such issues, even if the result is sometimes a compromise in American
foreign policy goals to build such a coalition.

2. Long-term Security/Domestic Discontent
Bell identified the need to quell domestic discontent and unrest
among racial minorities as integral to the mid-twentieth century cases and
legislation supporting civil rights for African Americans. Bell notes that the
level of discontent among African Americans regarding segregation
increased dramatically in the years after World War II, particularly as the
Cold War developed and the Soviet Union made substantial changes to
eliminate state-sponsored racial discrimination ahead of the United
States.101
Current levels of discontent among Muslim populations within the
United States have remained relatively low,102 arguably cutting against the
utility of interest convergence in this context right now. However, quelling
domestic discontent among those communities most affected by domestic
counterterrorism policies would serve two imperatives: first, it would
(Admin) 2048, [62] (Eng.) (in which the court noted that the United States government had
threatened to withhold terrorism-related intelligence from the British government if
mention of U.S. classified information were to be made public in an English court).
99 See 2011 NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY, supra note 93, at 1 (noting that allied nations
face similar security challenges from similar threats, and that cooperation is preferable to
attempting to safeguard homeland security unilaterally).
100 See PEW POLITICAL TYPOLOGY, supra note 34, at 90 (finding that 53% of the public
supports the U.S. taking into account the interest of allies, despite the possible resultant
policy compromises).
101 Bell, Interest Convergence, supra note 79, at 524–25 (citing arguments made by Paul
Robeson in 1949).
102 See ABU DHABI GALLUP CENTER, MUSLIM AMERICANS—FAITH, FREEDOM, AND THE
FUTURE: EXAMINING U.S. MUSLIMS’ POLITICAL, SOCIAL AND SPIRITUAL ENGAGEMENT
TEN YEARS AFTER 9/11, at 13 (Aug. 2011) [hereinafter 2011 GALLUP POLL] (noting that
although Muslim Americans tend to be more skeptical of U.S. foreign policy, military and
law enforcement than other religious groups within the United States, they are optimistic
about their futures in the United States).
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encourage buy-in from Muslim communities by demonstrating that the
government does not perceive Muslim communities to be singularly
threatening in terms of posing a threat of terrorism; second, it would
encourage Muslim communities to counteract radicalizing messages that
may be reaching individuals within the communities.103
Such efforts have been important in countries like the United
Kingdom, where the radicalization of domestic Muslims has been significant
and has assisted terrorist groups in recruitment, financing, and currying
sympathy among discontented Muslims.104 Efforts in the post-9/11 context
(and more specifically, in the post-July 2005 context)105 have focused on
combating radicalization in U.K. Muslim communities and mosques,
improving outreach by law enforcement, and stepping up recruitment of
racial and religious minorities in law enforcement positions that interact
with Muslim communities.106
This effort has also been undertaken by the Obama administration
and has been largely successful in terms of maintaining Obama’s
103 See generally THE WHITE HOUSE, EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS TO PREVENT
VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN THE UNITED STATES (Aug. 2011) (emphasizing both points
throughout the White House plan to counter radicalization). Cf. Press Release,
Representative Peter T. King, King Statement on Obama Administration Violent Extremism Strategy,
http://homeland.house.gov/press-release/king-statement-obama-administration-violentextremism-strategy (Aug. 3, 2011) (voicing concern that “the report which suggests some
equivalency of threats between al-Qaeda and domestic extremists and also with the
politically correct inference that legitimate criticism of certain radical organizations or
elements of the Muslim-American community should be avoided.”).
104 See ANDREW BLICK ET AL., DEMOCRATIC AUDIT, THE RULES OF THE GAME:
TERRORISM, COMMUNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 3 (2006),
http://filestore.democraticaudit.com/file/649c8cd74218a40c8f84fccf5b2e33791282640509/jrrt-leaflet.pdf (citing polls that show as many as 120,000 Muslims in the U.K.
stated that the London bombings were justified); JOHN THORNE & HANNAH STUART, THE
CTR. FOR SOCIAL COHESION, ISLAM ON CAMPUS: A SURVEY OF UK STUDENT
OPINIONS43 (2008), available at http://www.socialcohesion.co.uk/files/1231525079_1.pdf
(reporting that an online survey of over 600 Muslim students in U.K. showed 32% of them
thought it would be justifiable to kill in the name of religion).
105 Britain’s outreach to Muslim communities stepped up in the wake of the July 2005
attacks on the London public transportation system, which killed 52 people and injured
over 700. See Ralph Frammolino, British Muslim Outreach Hits a Rough Patch, L.A. TIMES Aug.
21, 2006, available at http://articles latimes.com/2006/aug/21/world/fg-social21.
106 See Tom Parker, United Kingdom: Once More unto the Breach, in SAFETY, LIBERTY AND
ISLAMIST TERRORISM 26–27 (Gary Schmitt ed., 2011).
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favorability ratings among U.S. Muslims.107 However, the long-term
confidence in the U.S. government and U.S. law enforcement may erode,108
as it has in other countries,109 if the perception that Muslims are being
unfairly targeted by U.S. national security policy increases. Potential
difficulties in reconciling the rhetoric of pluralism, diversity and protection
of civil liberties that have been the focal point of administration statements
with actual policies are exemplified in the Obama administration’s recent
aggressive prosecution of Muslims in the United States on allegations of
material support to terrorism,110 the widespread detention and removal of
Muslim immigrants,111 and the administration’s use of the state secrets
privilege to forestall any civil rights litigation by Muslim Americans who
allege that their mosques were targeted for warrantless surveillance purely
on religious grounds.112
107 See 2011 GALLUP POLL, supra note 102, at 19 (noting that approximately 80% of Muslim
Americans approved of President Obama’s job performance, the highest of any religious
group).
108 Stephen J. Schulhofer et al., American Policing at a Crossroads, 101 J. CRIM L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 335, 365–66 (2011), available at
http://www law.northwestern.edu/jclc/backissues/v101/n2/1012_335.Schulhofer_et_al.p
df (discussing the fragileness of cooperation in the counterterrorism context because
“cooperation could mean exposing people with whom they share close ethnic and religious
ties to unusually harsh procedures and sanctions.”); David Cole, Enemy Aliens, supra note 2
(warning that law enforcement needs to be careful with its treatment towards Muslim
communities because its crime-fighting tactics might alienate them).
109 See BLICK ET AL., supra note 104, at 3–4 (2006) (citing how Muslims in the United
Kingdom feel separated from the UK population as a whole because of the
counterterrorism policies implemented).
110 See, e.g., Press Release, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Woodbridge Man Charged with
Providing Material Support to Terrorist Organization, (Sept. 2, 2011), available at
http://www.fbi.gov/washingtondc/press-releases/2011/woodbridge-man-charged-withproviding-material-support-to-terrorist-organization (detailing the arrest of a Pakistani man
residing in Virginia based on his posting of videos to YouTube that expressed support for
Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, a designated foreign terrorist organization).
111 See generally CTR. FOR HUM. RTS. AND GLOBAL JUSTICE & ASIAN AM. LEGAL DEF. AND
EDUC. FUND, UNDER THE RADAR: MUSLIMS DEPORTED, DETAINED, AND DENIED ON
UNSUBSTANTIATED TERRORISM 8 (2011) (stating that “the government is actively trying to
deport and deny entrance, green cards, or citizenship to Muslim citizen,” and quoting
David Cole who remarked that Muslims and the Arab community in the United States are
subjected to a zero-tolerance immigration policy).
112 See Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of the Motion for Summary
Judgment at 27–30, Fazaga v. F.B.I., (C.D. Cal. 2012) )No. SA11-CV-00301) (describing
the alleged national security threat of allowing the plaintiffs’ Bivens action to continue). The
government’s brief further argues that “mounting a full and effective defense against the
religious discrimination claims would create an unjustifiable risk of revealing state secrets,
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Nonetheless, because the Obama administration has been successful
in maintaining the political support of a vast majority of Muslims, the
likelihood of domestic discontent within the United States acting as a
significant factor in bringing about rights-protective legislation or policy
seems low at this point.

3. Curbing Government Spending
Fiscal responsibility and the curtailment of government spending is a
cornerstone of conservative political platforms.113 As such, it is unsurprising
that many libertarians and some conservatives support or are willing to
tolerate a significant reduction in defense spending as a way to reduce the
U.S. budget deficit,114 even though such views have not percolated into
conservative platforms yet. Such a move is often championed by liberals and
many Democrats115 for both fiscal and ideological reasons.116 In particular,
cutting back on expensive counterterrorism efforts that have not been
proven necessary, such as the Department of Homeland Security’s use of
fusion centers,117 may have the effect of protecting communities most
affected by them while helping to balance budgets.

even if plaintiffs could make a prima facie case . . . with nonprivileged evidence.” Id. at 34
(internal citations omitted). See also Declaration of Eric H. Holder, Attorney General of the
United States, Fazaga, (No. SA11-CV-00301) (detailing the reasons why the state secrets
privilege was asserted by the Department of Justice).
113 See 2012 REPUBLICAN PARTY PLATFORM, supra note 40, at 3–4.
114 See PEW POLITICAL TYPOLOGY, supra note 34, at 72 (showing that 48% of Libertarians
and 28-29% of conservative Republicans support lowering defense spending as a means of
deficit reduction). See also Rand Paul, Romney’s Wrong on Middle East, Defense Spending,
CNN.COM. (Oct. 10, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/10/10/opinion/rand-paulromney-foreign-policy/index.html (arguing that defense spending should be cut as a matter
of fiscal responsibility).
115 See PEW POLITICAL TYPOLOGY, supra note 34, at 72 (showing that 79% of “Solid
Liberals” and between 40 to 49% of moderate Democrats support a reduction in defense
spending).
116 See, e.g., Christopher Drew & Elisabeth Bumiller, Military Budgets Reflects a Shift in U.S.
Strategy, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2009, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/07/us/politics/07defense.html?pagewanted=all.
117 See STAFF OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, S. COMM. ON
HOMELAND SEC. AND GOV’T AFF., 112TH CONG., FEDERAL SUPPORT FOR AND
INVOLVEMENT IN STATE AND LOCAL FUSION CENTERS 3–4 (Comm. Print 2012) (noting
that the work of fusion centers appears to have violated the civil liberties of many U.S.

216

217

Harvard National Security Journal / Vol. 4

A comparative example is useful: U.K. political parties are not
known for their willingness to form coalitions unless absolutely necessary to
secure governmental control.118 Yet in 2010, the Tory-Liberal Democrat
coalition government made clear that it would try to curtail some
antiterrorism measures that were prone to abuse,119 giving rise to the
possibility that coalition-building between the political left—interested in
protecting civil liberties and reducing the marginalization of outsider
communities120—and the political right—interested in cutting back on
costly government programs and lessening government involvement in the
lives of private citizens121—can lead to limited synergies in curtailing
citizens, has not produced successful counterterrorism results, and cost between $289
million and $1.4 billion in federal funds from 2003 to 2011).
118 MICHAEL RUSH, PARLIAMENT TODAY 24 (2005). Such coalition-building is more likely
in other parliamentary nations in which more political parties wield significant power. Id.
See also S.H. BELAVADI, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF PARLIAMENTARY PROCEDURE IN
INDIA 215 (1988) (arguing that the multiplicity of parties in India lends itself to a lack of
order and cohesion, but also allows for movement beyond traditional party rivalries).
119 See SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT, Review of CounterTerrorism and Security Powers, Review Findings and Recommendations, 2011, Cm. 8004,
at 3 (U.K.) (recommending the repeal or narrowing of various counterterrorism measures
in order to “correct the imbalance that has developed between the State’s security powers
and civil liberties, restoring those liberties wherever possible and focusing those powers
where necessary”); Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition Agreement, CIVIL LIBERTIES
¶10 (2010). The Agreement states that, among other goals, the coalition government will
work toward curtailing invasive and overreaching laws, and instituting “safeguards against
the misuse of anti-terrorism legislation.” Id. See also Queen’s Speech - Freedom (Great
Repeal) Bill, NUMBER 10 (May 25, 2010), http://www.number10.gov.uk/queensspeech/2010/05/queens-speech-freedom-great-repeal-bill-50647 (emphasizing the need to
repeal legislation that has compromised civil liberties).
120 See LIBERAL DEMOCRATS, LIBERAL DEMOCRAT MANIFESTO 94–95 (2010). This 2010
campaign platform by the Liberal Democrats noted that “the best way to combat terrorism
is to prosecute terrorists, not give away hard-won British freedoms.” The manifesto
promised four reforms in Britain’s security framework: to “[r]each out to the communities
most at risk of radicalisation to improve the relationships between them and the police and
increase the flow of intelligence,” to eliminate “control orders, which can use secret
evidence to place people under house arrest,” to “[r]educe the maximum period of precharge detention to 14 days,” and to “[m]ake it easier to prosecute and convict terrorists by
allowing intercept evidence in court and by making greater use of postcharge questioning.”
Id.
121 See CONSERVATIVE PARTY, INVITATION TO JOIN THE GOVERNMENT OF BRITAIN:
CONSERVATIVE MANIFESTO 79 (2010). This 2010 campaign platform by the Conservatives
argued that the Labor government had “trampled on liberties and, in their place, compiled
huge databases to track the activities of millions of perfectly innocent people, giving public
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potential misuse and abuse of national security powers.122 Although such a
coalition may be highly flawed in terms of both rights protection and
decision-making on fiscal austerity,123 it may represent a political
opportunity that would otherwise not exist.
In the domestic sphere, such concern about financial strain and
cutting budget deficits can lead to the exertion of left-right pressure to
decrease the U.S. financial commitment to the war in Afghanistan.124
In a time of fiscal austerity and pressure to bring government
spending under control in numerous categories, politicians who advocate for
better cost-benefits analyses of homeland security spending—a measure
long recommended by nonpartisan observers125—would be on solid political
ground, regardless of party affiliation.126
bodies extraordinary powers to intervene in the way we live our lives.” Id. Instead, the
Conservatives suggested that new legislation be introduced to stop “state encroachment,”
“protect people from unwarranted intrusion by the state,” and save money by cutting back
on unnecessary security initiatives. Id.
122 See Henry Porter, A Tory-Lib Dem Coalition Offers Hope for Civil Liberties, THE GUARDIAN,
May 10, 2010, available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/henryporter/2010/may/10/conservativeliberal-democrat-coalition-civil-liberties) (noting that civil liberties was one of a few areas in
which Conservative and Liberal Democrat priorities were aligned). See also David Fontana,
Government in Opposition, 119 Yale L.J. 548, 606 (2009) (theorizing that national security
policy may be better reasoned in nations where political minorities take an active role in
governance).
123 Adam Tomkins, National Security and the Due Process of Law, 64 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS.
215, 217–223 (2011) (describing due process problems with regard to the regime of special
advocates and closed material that had yet to be addressed by the Coalition Government).
124 Helene Cooper, Sagging Economy Draws Attention to War Spending, N.Y. TIMES, June 22,
2011, at A1 (highlighting a bipartisan critique of war spending during a slow economic
recovery, and quoting 2012 Republican presidential candidate Jon M. Huntsman, Jr. as
noting that national security can be maintained without the level of expense being incurred
by the United States).
125 See John Mueller & Mark G. Stewart, Does the United States Spend Too Much on Homeland
Security, SLATE (Sept. 7, 2011), available at http://www.slate.com/id/2303167/ (noting that
the increased cost of homeland security had totaled over one trillion dollars since 2001, and
that recommendations by Government Accountability Office, the 9/11 Commission and
other sources to institute a rigorous cost-benefit analysis regarding homeland security
spending had been largely ignored).
126 Fiscal austerity can, in the extreme, lead to measures such as mass detention in the name
of efficiency. However, assuming that the “tolerant values” articulated by Sen still have
sway in society, such a result in the name of pure fiscal austerity seems unlikely. SEN, THE
IDEA OF JUSTICE, supra note 21, at 352.
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4. Appealing to Libertarian interests
The 2010 success of libertarian Rand Paul’s U.S. Senate campaign
and the success of several “Tea Party” congressional candidates exemplify
the strength of libertarian interests in supporting measures that curtail
government spending and the reach of government into private lives, even
in the areas of national security and surveillance powers. Since the 2010
elections, several left-right congressional coalitions have attempted (largely
unsuccessfully) to curb national security measures out of concern for civil
rights and for preservation of liberty interests. For example, in early 2011,
amendments to the Patriot Act were delayed briefly due to a left-right
objection to the broad surveillance powers accorded to the government.127
In May 2012, a momentary left-right coalition emerged to attempt to limit
provisions of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2012 that allowed
for the indefinite detention without charge or trial for those apprehended on
U.S. soil.128 Ultimately, both of these efforts failed, largely based on
accusations that lawmakers who supported these limitations were “coddling
terrorists.”129
A similar dynamic occurred in the United Kingdom in 2008, when
libertarian-leaning Conservatives and Liberal Democrats opposed proposed
expansions of the right to detain individuals without charge.130 Nonetheless,
proposed legislative changes promoted by civil libertarians were largely
rejected based on the strength of the center-right political consensus.131
Although these efforts failed, there is still some value in considering
interest convergence theory with regard to libertarian groups. Because
libertarian and conservative interests that promote protection of individual
rights include the protection of gun ownership rights, libertarians have
expressed concern that gun-owning Americans will find their rights
hemmed by antiterrorism measures. Despite the Department of Homeland
See Charlie Savage, Patriot Act Battle Could Hinder Investigators, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2011,
at A18, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/26/us/politics/26patriot.html?_r=0.
128 Jonathan Weisman, House Vote Upholds Indefinite Detention of Terror Suspects, N.Y. TIMES,
May 19, 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/19/us/politics/house-votesto-preserve-a-power-of-indefinite-detention.html.
129 Id.
130 See Pantazis & Pemberton, supra note 41, at 654.
131 Id.
127
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Security reporting on the dangerousness of right-wing extremism within the
United States,132 libertarians have attempted to curtail the applicability of
lone wolf provisions of the Patriot Act possibly applying to right-wing gun
owners.133 This clearly gives rise to an opportunity for left-right coalitionbuilding.
A modern example of this kind of convergence involving gun
ownership rights can be found in the amicus briefs of United States v. Jones,
recently decided by the United States Supreme Court.134 Jones raised the
issue of whether the attachment by law enforcement of a GPS tracking
device to a vehicle for a one-month period constitutes a search such that
Fourth Amendment protections attach to the surveillance of the vehicle.135
Although Jones involved the issue of cocaine trafficking, the government,
defendants, and amici curiae were fully cognizant of the potentially broad
implications of this case with regard to counterterrorism law and policy.
The government, in its writ petition, argued that to foreclose
warrantless GPS surveillance would detrimentally affect counterterrorism
operations.136 The appellants, on the other hand, raised the specter that to
allow such surveillance would lead to “mass, suspicionless GPS monitoring”
within the United States.137 Both of the primary briefs focused on the
traditional Fourth Amendment concerns—the tension between privacy
rights and civil liberties of individuals on the one hand, and the ability of
law enforcement to effectively investigate illegal activity on the other.

132 See generally U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, RIGHTWING EXTREMISM: CURRENT
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CLIMATE FUELING RESURGENCE IN RADICALIZATION AND
RECRUITMENT (2009), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/eprint/rightwing.pdf.
133 Protecting gun ownership rights continues to be a priority for vast majorities of staunch
conservatives and libertarians in the United States. PEW POLITICAL TYPOLOGY, supra note
34, at 89 (finding that 77% of libertarians and 86%of staunch conservatives find the
protection of gun ownership to be important).
134 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
135 Id. at 946–47 (2012).
136 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 24, certiorari, Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (No. 101259) (arguing that the D.C. Circuit decision “prevents law enforcement officers from using
GPS devices in an effort to gather information to establish probable cause, which will
seriously impede the government’s ability to investigate leads and tips on drug trafficking,
terrorism, and other crimes.”).
137 Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 19, Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012)
(No. 10-1259).
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The amicus brief filed by the Council on American-Islamic
Relations (CAIR) on behalf of Jones likewise focused on Fourth and First
Amendment concerns, noting that Muslims have borne the disparate impact
of law enforcement’s warrantless attachment of GPS tracking devices to
vehicles.138 Further, CAIR argued that this disparate impact leads to a
chilling effect on the religious expression, associational rights and speech of
Muslims in the United States, constituting a First Amendment violation.139
The amicus brief filed by the Gun Owners Association of America,
Inc. (“Gun Owners Association”),140 however, offers a very different take on
the nature of the opposition to government surveillance. The Gun Owners
Association supported the Government’s petition for a writ of certiorari, but
for the purpose of encouraging the Court to rethink its Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence altogether and draw a harder line against warrantless
surveillance conducted by law enforcement in all contexts, including
counterterrorism surveillance.141 The Gun Owners Association argued that
the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence predicated on a privacy interest is
constitutionally unsound,142 and advocated, based on the recent gun rights
decision in District of Columbia v. Heller,143 for an originalist approach to the
Fourth Amendment that protects the property interests of individuals from
unlawful search and seizure by the government.144
This approach appeared to be singularly unconcerned with the
rights of marginalized outsider groups, but the effect of agreeing with the
argument here is the same: Extensive warrantless surveillance using GPS
technology—no matter whether the subject is a gun owner, an alleged
cocaine trafficker, or a person under suspicion of a terrorism connection—
138 Brief of Amicus Curiae the Council on American-Islamic Relations in Support of the
Respondent at 4, 10–12, Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (No. 10-1259) [hereinafter CAIR
Brief]..
139 Id. at 13, 15–20.
140 Brief Amicus Curiae of Gun Owners of America, Inc., et al., Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012)
(No. 10-1259) [hereinafter Gun Owners Amicus Brief] (in support of the petition for a writ
of certiorari).
141 See id. at 3–5.
142 Id. at 14–18.
143 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (using an originalist and textualist
interpretation of the Second Amendment to find an individual’s constitutionally guaranteed
right to possess and carry firearms for the purpose of self-defense).
144 See Gun Owners Amicus Brief, supra note 142, at 7–10 citing Heller and looking to the
text of the Fourth Amendment to support a property-based approach).
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would be prohibited under both a rights-based approach and a propertybased approach.
These multifaceted approaches to limiting the power of the
government to conduct warrantless surveillance proved successful in the
context of Jones.145 The majority opinion, authored by Justice Scalia, looked
to originalist understandings of physical trespass and property rights under
the Fourth Amendment to invalidate the government’s surveillance of Jones,
specifically leaving open the question of whether prolonged warrantless
surveillance of a suspected terrorist that did not involve physical trespass
would be found similarly unconstitutional.146 The concurrences authored by
Justices Sotomayor147 and Alito focused on Fourth Amendment protections
based on contemporary reasonable expectations of privacy by individuals.148
These varied approaches ultimately added up to every member of the Court
agreeing that the warrantless surveillance conducted in Jones was
unconstitutional,149 a decision that was heralded by groups on the right and
left of the political spectrum.150 This support across political boundaries
See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
See id. at 954. The Court’s opinion made no reference to Heller or the specific arguments
raised in the Gun Owners Amicus Brief, but the property-based Fourth Amendment
arguments made were largely similar. See id. at 949 (holding that there was “no doubt” that
actions similar to the physical attachment of the GPS tracking device to Jones’s property
“would have been a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when it was
adopted” (citing Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765)).
147 See Jones, at 954 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). Justice Sotomayor argued that warrantless
surveillance that involves no physical trespass but mines and stores a large volume of data
may still be subject to classification as a “search” for Fourth Amendment purposes. Id. She
noted that such surveillance “chills associational and expressive freedoms,” and “is
susceptible to [government] abuse,” particularly when such surveillance can disclose a
range of private data, including “trips to the psychiatrist, the plastic surgeon, the abortion
clinic, the AIDS treatment center, the strip club, the criminal defense attorney, the by-thehour motel, the union meeting, the mosque, synagogue or church, the gay bar and on and
on.” Id. at 955–56 (quoting People v. Weaver, 12 N.Y. 3d 433, 441–42 (2009) (internal
quotations omitted).
148 See id. at 962–63 (Alito, J., concurring). Justice Alito would evaluate Fourth Amendment
claims based on the reasonable expectation of privacy of individuals, taking into account
the changing nature of this expectation as technological advances occur. See id.
149 Justice Alito notes that legislation that curtails warrantless surveillance may be the best
action to deal with the questions left open by Jones, but notes that such legislation does not
seem to have materialized at the state or federal level. See id. at 964.
150 See, e.g., Ategah Khaki, Supreme Court Rules Government Violated Privacy Rights in GPS Tracking
Case, ACLU, (Jan. 23 2012), http://www.aclu.org/blog/technology-and-liberty/supremecourt-rules-government-violated-privacy-rights-gps-tracking-case (discussing the ongoing
145
146
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speaks to the possibility of using interest convergence to garner legislative
support for such measures.

5. When Measures Affect Insider Groups
The majority population is more likely to accept the use of
oppressive or intrusive national security measures so long as the effects of
those measures do not impinge on the rights and privileges of the majority
population,151 but instead are limited to outsider groups whose welfare is of
diminished concern to majority groups.152
struggle for judicial recognition of a broad range of privacy rights); Jim Harper, U.S. v.
Jones: A Big Privacy Win, THE CATO INSTITUTE (Jan. 23, 2012), http://www.cato-atliberty.org/u-s-v-jones-a-big-privacy-win/ (lauding the Court’s focus on a property-based
Fourth Amendment protection against warrantless surveillance).
151 See Cole, Enemy Aliens, supra note 2, at 988–89 (noting that U.S. citizens are complacent
about the deprivation of liberty because of explicit or implicit assurances that citizens’ rights
will be left intact). Government rhetoric has fostered this dichotomy since soon after the
September 11 terrorist attacks. In late 2001, then-Attorney General John Ashcroft argued
that civil liberties-based critiques of the post-September 11 legal framework were trying to
“aid terrorists” “erode our national unity,” and “scare peace-loving people.” Department of
Justice Oversight, Preserving Our Freedom While Defending Against Terrorism, Hearing Before the S. Jud.
Comm., 107th Cong. 313 (2001) (statement of John Ashcroft, Att’y Gen. of the United
States). In setting up this dichotomy, Ashcroft is clearly implying that the vast majority of
Americans are not interested in the preservation of civil liberties, presumably because they
are not personally and significantly affected by the national security state.
152 The differential reaction of those within a societal majority to policies that affect outsider
groups has been well-documented. See Keith Aoki, Foreignness and Asian American Identities:
Yellowface, World War II Propaganda and Bifurcated Racial Stereotypes, 4 UCLA ASIAN PAC. AM.
L.J. 1, 5–6 (1996) (discussing the disparate legal, societal and media treatment of Asian
Americans); Muneer I. Ahmad, A Rage Shared By Law: Post September 11 Racial Violence as
Crimes of Passion, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1259, 1262 (2004) (noting that “hate violence against
Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians...[received] short shrift in governmental, media or
public attention”). Some have couched this perspective on national security laws as part of
postcolonial theory. See e.g., Nick J. Sciullo, The Ghost in the Global War on Terror: Critical
Perspectives and Dangerous Implications for National Security and the Law, 3 DREXEL L. REV. 561,
575 (2011). For a finding that hate crimes toward Muslims and Arabs increased
dramatically since September 11 highlights the perceived “otherness” of these groups see
William B. Rubenstein, The Real Story of U.S. Hate Crimes Statistics: An Empirical Analysis, 78
TUL. L. REV. 1213, 1234–1240 (2004) (documenting and analyzing the surge in postSeptember 11 hate crimes). Adrien K. Wing has thoughtfully analyzed how the current
“otherness” of Arabs and Muslims is part of a long trend in U.S. history of marginalizing
particular groups depending on public sentiment at the time. See Adrien Katherine Wing,
Civil Rights in the Post 911 World: Critical Race Praxis, Coalition Building, and the War on Terrorism,
63 LA. L. REV. 717, 721, 728–29 (2003).

2012 / National Security Interest Convergence

However, at the point that the mainstream public finds that it is
impacted negatively by the creep of national security measures on
constitutionally guaranteed freedoms and liberties, opposition tends to grow
dramatically.153 This dynamic has been most pronounced in the context of
concerns over privacy rights and the fear of Fourth Amendment erosions
affecting the majority of Americans.154
For example, the public backlash against Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) parameters of airport screening searches155 was
extreme, involving intense media scrutiny as to whether body scanners and
invasive pat-down searches were necessary to enhance airport security.156
The Department of Homeland Security and TSA moved relatively quickly
to make the searches less onerous and invasive,157 to some extent reflecting
the power of constituents when they also had to experience the universally
applicable intrusive body scans and pat downs.158
See PEW POLITICAL TYPOLOGY, supra note 34, at 96 (finding that 68% of those surveyed
opined that Americans should not have to forgo privacy for national security reasons, and
that this belief was relatively consistent across all political groups).
154 See David K. Shipler, Op-Ed., Free to Search and Seize, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2011, at A21.
Shipler argues that the public should be concerned about precedent that is broad enough to
encompass intrusions on the general public’s Fourth Amendment rights, noting that “if a
black man in a poor neighborhood can be stopped and frisked with minimal reason, so can
a white woman in a rich neighborhood,” and observing that “American history is replete
with assaults on liberties that first target foreigners, minorities and those on the political
margins, then spread toward the mainstream.” Id. He also attempts to galvanize the
“mainstream” by noting that currently, the F.B.I. is using some of its counterterrorism tools
to investigate peace activists and labor leaders in the Midwest. See id.
155 See John Pistole, Adm’r, Transp. Sec. Admin., Remarks to AVSEC World 2010 (Nov. 2,
2010) (transcript available at
http://www.tsa.gov/press/speeches/110210_avsec_world_2010.shtm) (remarking about
the new technological advances with body scanners).
156 See Derek Kravitz, Airport ‘pat-downs’ cause growing passenger backlash, WASH. POST, Nov. 13,
2010, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/11/12/AR2010111206580.html.
157 See Susan Stellin, Screening Still a Pain a Airports, Fliers Say, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2011, at
B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/22/business/airport-screening-is-still-apain-fliers-complain.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (noting the new, less invasive, security
policies implemented by TSA).
158 See Pico Iyer, We’re All Terror Suspects Now, GUARDIAN NEWSPAPER, Aug. 28, 2011,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/aug/28/we-all-terror-suspects-now (describing
the irritation of white Westerners at the presumption of guilt that accompanies the
heightened security at airports and other high-value security sites).
153
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This indignant response yielded rights-protective results at the
legislative level as well. Bipartisan efforts at curbing intrusive TSA search
methods reflected the concern of politicians and their constituents that too
many members of the public are being affected by counterterrorism
measures that may have been more acceptable if applied only to
outsiders.159
Likewise, widespread counterterrorism-oriented data mining efforts
by the government that encompass broad swaths of the U.S. public are
viewed as problematic by libertarians and others concerned with privacy
rights. However, others have posited that such efforts, if targeted only at a
discrete minority population, would be met with significantly less resistance
from the mainstream population.160 Unease surrounding broad surveillance
authority is not limited to the United States, and calls for reform of broad
surveillance measures in the United Kingdom suggests that the impact on
majority groups may translate into support for civil libertarian efforts that
curtail such authority.161
III. Rights Protection and the Limitations of Interest Convergence
When reflecting on the phenomenon of what this Article calls
interest convergence, Professor Bell concluded with some disappointment
that civil rights groups like the NAACP allowed the fight for racial justice to
be compromised and perhaps co-opted by a government focused primarily
on foreign policy and anti-communist concerns.162 I share Bell’s
disappointment with the unwillingness to focus fully on rights protection as
the priority and purpose of groups like the NAACP. Yet it is easy to
understand the NAACP’s motivation in aligning its work with the
See, e.g., Aircraft Passenger Whole-Body Imaging Limitation Act of 2011, H.R. 1279,
112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011) (bipartisan proposal to establish limitations on the advanced
imaging technology used for airport security screening).
160 See Tal Z. Zarsky, Governmental Data Mining and its Alternatives, 116 PENN. ST. L. REV. 285,
327–28 (2012).
161 See Pantazis & Pemberton, supra note 41, at 664–65.
162 See Derrick Bell, Racial Equality: Progressives’ Passion for the Unattainable, 94 VA. L. REV. 495,
509–10 (2008) (reviewing RISA L. GOLUBOFF, THE LOST PROMISE OF CIVIL RIGHTS
(2007)) (lamenting the NAACP’s refusal to provide legal assistance to individuals such as
Paul Robeson and W.E.B. Dubois, who were perceived as being “too involved with far-left
groups,” that intimated potential communist ties).
159
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government’s anti-communist platform: Even a limited victory in the realm
of racial justice would be achieved only through the garnering of some
measure of political and popular support; this support was highly vulnerable
to attacks based on perceived communist sympathies; and without the
support, courts were unlikely to support civil rights measures, no matter how
important racial justice was.163 The NAACP was formulating strategy based
on the realpolitik nature of garnering political support. Likewise, in the postSeptember 11 landscape in which political support for those marginalized
by the national security state is hard to marshal, focusing on specific issues
where interest convergence allows for the achievement of political victories
without the vulnerability of being labeled “soft on terror” is a matter of
negotiating otherwise precarious political realities.164
The fact that Americans feel strongly that they should not have to
sacrifice privacy and civil liberties for the sake of national security165
suggests possible avenues for political consensus-building that would likely
also positively impact the civil liberties of marginalized groups.
Yet leveraging interest convergence to realize rights-protective gains
has serious limitations. Bell recognized the natural limitation of interest
convergence, namely, when the interests of the majority diverge from that of
the outsider group, then the majority will no longer spend its political capital
on a measure that happens to be rights-protective. Bell argued in the
education context that truly effective desegregation remedies were
unavailable in the line of school segregation cases following Brown because
whites eventually believed that they may suffer substantial negative effects,
or may not inure any benefits, from large-scale desegregation measures.166

163 See generally Jacobi, supra note 13 (applying positive political theory to the decisionmaking of courts).
164 Amartya Sen’s theory of justice predicated on guiding “reasoned choice of policies,
strategies or institutions” apart from identifying “fully just social arrangements” is
particularly useful here, given that agreement—legal, moral or political—on what
constitutes a fully just social arrangement is not possible for those coming from different
philosophies and perspectives. SEN, supra note 21, at 15.
165 See PEW POLITICAL TYPOLOGY, supra note 34, at 96. The authors of the Pew study
noted that this consensus was one of the very few areas of convergence across the political
spectrum. Id.
166 Bell, Interest Convergence, supra note 79, at 526–33. Examples of the Supreme Court’s
narrowing view of the constitutional obligation to desegregate schools began in the 1970s,
almost two decades after Brown and the lack of meaningful desegregation in many school
districts. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (holding that multi-district
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In other words, at the point at which the cost to the white majority of
desegregation outweighed its benefits, desegregation no longer became a
priority. As such, the promise of integration—as opposed to the mere
removal of de jure segregation—contemplated in Brown was never
achieved.167 Extrapolating from Bell’s point, certain issues of social justice—
whether in the realm of civil rights, education or national security policymaking—that are not ripe for interest convergence but raise serious rights
concerns may never be addressed, even in a limited fashion.168
A second objection to using interest convergence stems from the use
of utilitarian justifications instead of basing reform efforts squarely on
justice, civil rights and human dignity. In the context of the AfricanAmerican civil rights movement of the mid-twentieth century, Martin
Luther King, Jr. argued that such pragmatism corrupted the search for
justice as the basis of reform efforts.169 This loss of overt moral justification
is ameliorated by the fact that the larger goal of promoting rights-protective
legislation is a morally laudable effort that may only be possible through
interest convergence.170
desegregation plans were unconstitutional unless a showing of intentional segregation were
made in each district).
167 See Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, The Social Construction of Brown v. Board of
Education: Law Reform and the Reconstructive Paradox, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 547, 548
(1994) (arguing that Brown accomplished relatively little in terms of reducing de facto
segregation).
168 See, e.g., Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Custodial Interrogation for Public Safety and IntelligenceGathering Purposes of Operational Terrorists Arrested Inside the United States,, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 25,
2011), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/25/us/25miranda-text.html
(providing an internal memorandum from the F.B.I. that recommends withholding
Miranda rights from terrorism suspects). Although the larger criminal defense bar may
have had strong objections to the chipping away of Miranda rights if the FBI policy applied
to a broader group of suspects, limitation of the policy to terrorism suspects has defused
strong objections from the non-terrorism defense bar.
169 See MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., LETTER FROM A BIRMINGHAM JAIL (1963). King
argued against those who counseled him toward a less direct approach in demanding civil
rights, noting that “[he] who prefers a negative peace which is the absence of tension to a
positive peace which is the presence of justice; who constantly says, ‘I agree with you in the
goal you seek, but I cannot agree with your methods of direct action’; who paternalistically
believes he can set the timetable for another man’s freedom; who lives by a mythical
concept of time and who constantly advises the Negro to wait for a ‘more convenient
season’” are a threat to the concepts of justice and freedom which ought to be at the heart
of reform efforts for more rights. Id.
170 See Cynthia Lee, Cultural Convergence: Interest Convergence Meets the Cultural Defense, 49 ARIZ.
L. REV. 911, 921 (2007). Lee considers Herbert Wechsler’s Toward Neutral Principles of
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Additionally, even the existence of interest convergence may not be
sufficient to compel legislative movement that includes a rights-protective
effect. Politicians will occasionally choose to forego action on a desirable
rights protective measure in the hopes that judicial review will bring about
the same result (albeit several years later) but without the political cost being
borne by individual representatives and senators.171 In such cases, legislators
may be gambling on the courts as a backstop, without knowing if a rightsdenigrating measure will be found unconstitutional or otherwise illegal.172
This reliance on the courts is sometimes ill-founded, since judges have
expressed reticence in second-guessing the political branches of government
in many security-related matters.173

Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 22–23 (1959), in which Wechsler argues that the
Supreme Court desegregation cases following Brown v. Board of Education—in which the
Supreme Court struck down numerous segregation statutes in brief per curiam decisions—
were not apparently decided on neutral principles of constitutional law. Derrick Bell’s
critique of Wechsler was based on Bell’s opinion that post-Brown desegregation
jurisprudence could have been decided on the neutral principle of racial equality before the
law, but ultimately was decided based on interest convergence. See Lee at 921. In this sense,
Bell is arguing that the morally preferable outcome of desegregation did occur, even if by
suboptimal means.
171 See Kate Zernike, Top Republicans Reach an Accord on Detainee Bill, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 22,
2006), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/22/washington/22detain.html.
172 Samuel Issacharoff and Richard Pildes have argued that courts often consider and
decide cases using a highly flawed “rights-versus-state-interest” formula, which lacks a
consistent theoretical framework from which the courts can articulate a reason that they are
intervening with legislative decision-making. See Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes,
supra note 19, at 646. Following this line of reasoning, legislators cannot assume that the
courts are impartial to partisan political pressures when determining where on the
rights/state interest spectrum to locate the constitutionality of a particular measure. Hence,
an assumption that the courts will be more rights-protective on a specific issue or piece of
legislation than the democratic process may be unwarranted and a matter of wishful
thinking for those politicians wanting to protect rights but lacking the political will or
support to do so.
173 See, e.g., Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1091–92 (9th Cir. Cal.
2010) (opining that if redress for victims of torture cannot be provided by the courts, redress
could still be provided by Congress). In India, the judiciary has opined that protection of
fundamental rights is a core mission of the courts. See A.K. Gopalan v. Union of India, AIR
1950 SC 27, at 34 (opinion of Kania, C.J.); see also SUDHIR KRISHNASWAMY, DEMOCRACY
AND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN INDIA 13 (2011) (discussing the judiciary’s commitment to
the basic structure doctrine). Nonetheless, courts often view their own role as limited when
national security matters are at stake. See Shylashri Shankar, SCALING JUSTICE: INDIA’S
SUPREME COURT, ANTI-TERROR LAWS, AND SOCIAL RIGHTS 61–71, 90–91 (2009)
(arguing that whereas social rights are considered an area in which the judiciary is expected
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Finally, issue-specific coalition building may not yield the exact
result desired by at least one group involved in the coalition. For example,
although the desire for fiscal restraint and to scale back intrusive
surveillance created a moment of convergence in the Tory-Lib Dem
coalition, members of each party and much of the public appeared
dissatisfied with the resulting fiscal austerity measures.
Conclusion
The lack of moral compass guiding policymakers when it comes to
fundamental questions of justice and fairness can be discouraging to activists
seeking better protection for civil rights and liberties. Yet using national
security interest convergence can do two important things: First, it can serve
as a positive analytical tool to better understand whether and how rightsprotective policies may be effectuated. Second, as a normative matter, it can
offer some insight as to what types of issue-specific coalition-building can be
used to yield small-scale results that are rights protective and benefit
outsider groups by hemming in certain aspects of the national security state.
This is particularly important when the national security framework has
evolved in a haphazard way that reflects political survivalist thinking on the
part of Congress and the President.174
Derrick Bell posited that many measures of racial justice for African
Americans were (and are) a matter of blacks being the third-party
beneficiaries of government actions meant primarily to effect a different
result. The Emancipation Proclamation helped the Union recruit freed
slaves as soldiers and disrupt the Confederate work force; the post-Civil War
amendments solidified political power for the Republican Party; Brown v.
Board of Education buttressed U.S. efforts to improve its international standing

to take an active role, security and secrecy are areas in which the constitutional framers and
Parliament have purposefully curtailed the judiciary’s ability to curb executive power).
174 Kent Roach describes the U.S. national security policy mash-up of the laws of war and
criminal justice system in the post-September 11 era as “largely unsuccessful,” since “[the
policymakers] have left the bitter impression of double standards that allow the state to
cherry-pick those aspects of the law of war and crime that best facilitates [their] interests
and powers. Such an approach is so casual when it comes to traditional legal categories that
it smacks of extra-legalism.” KENT ROACH, THE 9/11 EFFECT: COMPARATIVE COUNTERTERRORISM 165 (2011).
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and foreign policy during the Cold War.175 Certainly this list is not
exhaustive when it comes to providing a framework for the success of racial
justice efforts for African Americans. The same principles can be applied to
finding measures of justice for disparately impacted communities who have
been marginalized by national security laws and policies over the last
decade.176 By embracing the realities of realist political theory and using
them to create atypical coalitions around specific issues, national security
interest convergence resulting in genuine rights protection becomes a better
possibility.

DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE
UNFULFILLED HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM 71 (2004). Certainly this historical account is
not without opposition. Bruce Ackerman categorizes the political momentum behind the
post-Civil War amendments as legislators acting in a statesmen-like “higher lawmaking”
capacity. BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 207 (1998).
176 Two decades ago, Derrick Bell argued that:
175

The availability of constitutional protection for the society’s disadvantaged—
blacks, women, the poor, homosexuals, and the mentally and physically
disabled—is not actually determined by the quantity of harm alleged or of liability
proved. Social reform remedies, judicial and legislative, are instead the outward
manifestations of unspoken and perhaps unconscious policy conclusions that the
remedies, if granted, will secure, advance, or at least not harm societal interests
deemed important by the middle and upper classes.
Derrick Bell, “Victims as Heroes: A Minority Perspective on Constitutional Law,” in THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION: ROOTS, RIGHTS, AND RESPONSIBILITIES 176–77 (A.E. Dick
Howard ed., 1992). Certainly the same can be said for the application of realist theory to
national security measures.
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